HSM / PKCS#11 / Multi-Algorithm Signing

What you will do: Choose a JWT signing algorithm and sign with the browser HSM. Verify the original payload with the local public key, change the received subject, then restore it.

Worked example: With ML-DSA-65, the signature grows from the 256-byte RS256 baseline to 3,309 bytes. Verification accepts the original payload, rejects the changed subject and succeeds when the original value is restored.

Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.

Browse all Crypto Lab tools · Learn with Identity & Access Management with PQC

For your role

Developer / Engineer
Switch the signing algorithm from RS256 (RSA-2048) to an ML-DSA variant, press Sign Token (Live WASM) and then Verify Signature: the header, the signature size and the Size Impact Analysis show what your JWT libraries and token limits will see.
Security Architect
Use the Size Impact Analysis and the CBOR Token Encoding (CWT / COSE) alternative to decide whether a PQC token still fits your headers, cookies and gateways before choosing the algorithm.
Researcher / Academic
Run the IAM PQC Known Answer Tests panel, then compare the same payload signed with each algorithm to measure the exact signature and header overhead.
IT Ops / DevOps
The Verification Flow — Relying Party Perspective panel shows what every service that validates tokens must be able to parse after the switch; use it to list which relying parties need updating first.

Token Signing Migration Lab

Compare JWT signing algorithms side-by-side. Toggle between classical RS256/ES256 and quantum-safe ML-DSA variants to observe signature size impact and header changes.

Initializing SoftHSM…

C_Initialize → C_InitToken → C_OpenSession → C_Login

Signing Algorithm

Select algorithm to see header changes and signature size impact

Algorithm:
Quantum-Vulnerable
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256. Widely supported but quantum-vulnerable. Shor's algorithm breaks 2048-bit RSA. Must be migrated before a CRQC (cryptographically relevant quantum computer) becomes available.
Header (alg field)
{
  "alg": "RS256",
  "typ": "JWT",
  "kid": "rsa-2048-key-001"
}
The alg field must match the signing key type. JWK Set endpoint must expose the corresponding PQC public key.
Payload (unchanged)
{
  "sub": "user-1234",
  "name": "Alice Engineer",
  "email": "alice@corp.example",
  "roles": ["developer", "ci-pipeline"],
  "iat": 1741392000,
  "exp": 1741395600,
  "iss": "https://auth.corp.example",
  "aud": "https://api.corp.example"
}
The payload is algorithm-agnostic. No changes needed when migrating signing algorithm.
Signature (256 bytes)
Sign a token in Live HSM Mode or view an illustration.

Size Impact Analysis

256
Raw signature bytes
1.0x
vs RS256 (256B)
1ms
Signing time (est.)
755
Illustrative compact-token bytes

Encoded header 87 + payload 324 + signature 342 + 2 separators = 755 ASCII bytes. This sizing calculation uses the displayed signature byte count; it does not establish a valid, interoperable token or validate the signature encoding. HTTP and cookie framing are excluded.

Signature Size Comparison
RS256
256B
ES256
64B
ML-DSA-44
2,420B
ML-DSA-65
3,309B
ML-DSA-87
4,627B
Infrastructure Considerations
  • • Compare the compact token plus Authorization/Bearer framing and other request headers with the limits documented for the selected server and configuration
  • • For cookie transport, account for the cookie name, attributes and the selected browser/server limits. Token length alone does not establish fit
  • • Load balancer JWT validation: Envoy, Kong, AWS ALB must update JWT algorithms allow-list to include ML-DSA variants
  • • Client SDK updates: JOSE/JWT libraries (jose, jsonwebtoken, PyJWT) need PQC algorithm support — check vendor roadmaps

Alternative: CBOR Token Encoding (CWT / COSE)

JWT uses text-based JSON encoding. For constrained environments (IoT, mobile credentials, embedded systems), CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) with COSE signatures offer a binary-encoded alternative that reduces overhead — important when ML-DSA signatures already add kilobytes.

JWT / JOSE
  • • Text (base64url JSON)
  • • Wide browser/library support
  • • RFC 9964 (ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE)
  • • Published May 2026
CWT / COSE
  • • Binary (CBOR-encoded)
  • • Smaller envelope overhead
  • • RFC 9964 (ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE)
  • • Used in ISO 18013-5 mDL
When to choose
  • • IoT / embedded: CWT/COSE
  • • Mobile credentials: CWT/COSE
  • • Enterprise SSO / web: JWT
  • • Both: same ML-DSA signature

Both JWT and CWT use the same underlying ML-DSA (FIPS 204) signature — only the token envelope encoding differs. See RFC 9964 and RFC 9052 in the Library for specification details.

Verification Flow — Relying Party Perspective

After the IdP signs a JWT, the relying party must verify it. The verification chain: fetch JWKS endpoint → match kid → verify signature with the public key. Enable Live WASM and sign a token first to run live verification.

JWKS Endpoint Response (GET /.well-known/jwks.json)
{
  "keys": [{
    "kty": "RSA",
    "alg": "RS256",
    "kid": "rsa-2048-key-001",
    "n": "sLjA...long modulus...",
    "e": "AQAB",
    "use": "sig"
  }]
}
1Fetch JWKS

GET /.well-known/jwks.json — resolve public key matching kid in JWT header

2Reconstruct input

base64url(header) + "." + base64url(the received payload)

3C_VerifyInit / C_Verify

PKCS#11 v3.2 verification with the local RS256 public key used in this exercise

Enable Live WASM above, then sign a token to unlock verification.

Note: In illustration mode, signature data is representative. Enable Live HSM mode above to execute real PKCS#11 v3.2 signing and verification operations across all five algorithms. Keys generated here are for educational use only — in production IAM deployments, verify your HSM/KMS active FIPS 140-3 CMVP certificate, IdP/JWKS RFC 9964 support, and proxy/gateway HTTP header limits.

IAM PQC Known Answer Tests

OpenID Connect · SAML 2.0 · FIPS 204 · FIPS 198-1 · NIST SP 800-132

Predict a one-byte change

This fictional sample generates fresh ML-DSA-65 keys. Predict whether changing the selected byte should preserve verification or key confirmation, then run the actual operation.

Click Run known-answer checks to run 5 use-case scenarios. Evidence in this set: NIST ACVP-Server reference sample — Expected values copied from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository with immutable source identity; Published standard KAT — Expected values printed in a cited standard or consensus RFC; Functional round-trip — Output produced by an implementation is consumed by the same or paired implementation.

Reference samples from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository · OpenID Connect · SAML 2.0 · FIPS 204 · FIPS 198-1 · NIST SP 800-132 · Generated keys are for educational use only.

Known issue: the password-derivation (PBKDF2) test errors with CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD — this is a softhsm-wasm C_DeriveKey binding limitation, not a cryptographic failure. The other KAT rows are unaffected.

Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements

What this sample check establishes: Demonstrates cryptographic token and PKCS#11 partition migration steps from legacy classical mechanisms (`CKM_RSA_PKCS`, `CKM_ECDSA`) to PKCS#11 v3.2 PQC mechanisms.

Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Uses an in-browser softHSM emulation; it does not test vendor-specific HSM cloning protocols, M-of-N smartcard quorum ceremonies, or PCI key blocks.

What to require and test in your production tools:

  • OASIS PKCS#11 v3.2 compliant HSM client libraries supporting `C_EncapsulateKey`, `C_DecapsulateKey`, `CKM_ML_KEM`, and `CKM_ML_DSA`.
  • Dual-stack partition policies allowing co-existence of legacy classical keys and new PQC keys during phased application cutover.
  • Non-exportable private-key attributes (`CKA_SENSITIVE=TRUE`, `CKA_EXTRACTABLE=FALSE`) verified by HSM audit logs.

Try it

  1. 1. Predict before you run it.
  2. 2. Run or change the tool above.
  3. 3. Explain what the result shows.

Sign a token with RS256 and then with an ML-DSA variant. What in the Size Impact Analysis grows most?

Next step

Turn it into a plan: Hybrid Transition Planner

This tool practises the Identity & Access Management with PQC module, phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Hybrid Transition Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.