HSM / PKCS#11 / Firmware Signing
What you will do: Upload a firmware binary or use the sample UEFI manifest. Generate classical and PQC key pairs, sign the manifest and verify both signatures. Change the received manifest to test rejection.
Worked example: With the defaults — ML-DSA-65 against RSA-2048 with SHA-256 — both signatures come back VERIFIED and the Migration Comparison table shows the signature growing from 256 B to 3,309 B (12.9×).
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For your role
- Developer / Engineer
- Select ML-DSA-65 beside RSA-2048 in Upload & Configure, use the mock UEFI manifest or your own binary, and walk the four steps: the CMS output shows the pure-mode signing the RFC 9882 comment in the configuration refers to.
- Security Architect
- The side-by-side keys, signatures and CMS output show the size a firmware image grows by under ML-DSA-65, which is the number your boot ROM and update channel must have room for.
- Researcher / Academic
- Run the Secure Boot PQC Known Answer Tests panel, then compare the classical and post-quantum CMS structures produced from the same manifest.
- Certification & Validation Engineer
- Run the Secure Boot PQC Known Answer Tests panel, then sign the mock UEFI manifest with ML-DSA-65 beside RSA-2048 in Upload & Configure: the panel is algorithm evidence, while the CMS output is what the device's verifier will actually have to accept.
- IT Ops / DevOps
- Sign the mock UEFI manifest with both algorithms and keep the two CMS outputs: they are what a signing service and a verifier on the device exchange, and the difference between them is your update-pipeline change.
Firmware Signing Migrator
Sign firmware with both a classical algorithm and a post-quantum algorithm side-by-side. Compare keys, signatures, and CMS output. All PKCS#11 operations execute in SoftHSM3 WASM.
Initializing SoftHSM…
C_Initialize → C_InitToken → C_OpenSession → C_Login
Upload & Configure
Select algorithms, upload a firmware binary (or use the mock UEFI manifest), and review the pure-mode signing configuration.
// Pure mode per RFC 9882 §3.1 / RFC 9814 §1
// No caller pre-hashing — algorithm handles internallyWhy firmware signing matters
- UEFI Secure Boot verifies every firmware image against signed db certificates at boot
- TPM PCR measurements attest firmware integrity — signatures must survive quantum attacks
- Supply chain compromise via forged signatures is a critical threat — PQC eliminates Shor's algorithm risk
ML-DSA uses SHAKE-256 and SHAKE-128 internally (FIPS 204 §3.7); SLH-DSA-SHA2-128S uses SHA-256 internally (the "SHA2" in the name; SHA-512 appears only in the 192- and 256-bit SHA2 sets, FIPS 205 §11.2.2). Both are called in pure mode: the signer is handed the message directly, with no separate pre-hash step. HashML-DSA (pre-hash) is not specified for CMS (RFC 9882 §3.1) and must not be used in X.509 certificates (RFC 9881 §8.3). Your hash selection applies to: firmware digest display + classical signature mechanism (e.g. CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS).
Why HashML-DSA is not used in CMS (RFC 9882 §3.1)
“… in most situations, CMS signatures are computed over a set of signed attributes that contain a hash of the content, rather than being computed over the message content itself. Since signed attributes are typically small, use of pre-hash modes in the CMS wouldn't significantly reduce the size of the data to be signed, and hence offers no benefit.”
- What ML-DSA is given (RFC 9882 §3.2): with signedAttrs, the complete DER encoding of the signed attributes, which must include a content-type attribute and a message-digest attribute (the hash of the content). Without signedAttrs, the content itself. Signed attributes are the preferred form, and an HSM then receives only that small attribute set (§5).
- This demo builds SignedData without signedAttrs and signs the short manifest text directly, so it shows the pure-mode signing call but not the signed-attributes step. With no signed attributes the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm carries no weight, and the PQC envelope names the value the RFCs prescribe: SHA-512 for ML-DSA (RFC 9882 §3.3, MUST) and the tree hash, SHA-256, for SLH-DSA-SHA2-128S (RFC 9814 §4, SHOULD), whatever hash you picked for the classical signature.
- X.509 is a separate rule. RFC 9881 §8.3 bars HashML-DSA from certificates mainly for interoperability: a verifier would have to be told whether to run ML-DSA.Verify or HashML-DSA.Verify.
Drop firmware binary here
or click to browse — any file format
▸ Using mock UEFI firmware manifest (no file uploaded)
| Component | Size | Hash |
|---|---|---|
| PEI Core | 512 KB | a3f2c1d4e5b6a7f8... |
| DXE Core | 1.2 MB | b4c3d2e1f0a9b8c7... |
| UEFI Shell | 256 KB | c5d4e3f2a1b0c9d8... |
| Setup UI | 384 KB | d6e5f4a3b2c1d0e9... |
| Network Stack | 192 KB | e7f6a5b4c3d2e1f0... |
Choosing an algorithm
- ML-DSA-44 — NIST Level 2 · smallest ML-DSA keys/sigs · non-critical firmware where size matters
- ML-DSA-65 — NIST Level 3 · balanced · recommended general-purpose firmware signing
- ML-DSA-87 — NIST Level 5 · required by CNSA 2.0 for NSS; approved for firmware signing alongside the preferred single-tree LMS/XMSS (SP 800-208; multi-tree HSS and XMSS^MT are not allowed for NSS)
- SLH-DSA-SHA2-128S — NIST Level 1 · smallest pubkey (32 B) but very large signature (7,856 B) · This module's advice: use it only for root-of-trust and infrequent signing (e.g. UEFI PK/KEK), not per-image signing. Not part of CNSA and not approved for any use in NSS (NSA CNSA 2.0 FAQ v2.2, p. 11)
Note: Hash applies to classical signing mechanism (CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS) and digest display. PQC algorithms (ML-DSA-65) use SHAKE-256 and SHAKE-128 internally — pure mode per RFC 9882/9814.
Educational sandbox note: Simulation mode active. Algorithm selection, comparison table, and CMS structure are always shown. Browser WASM is an educational sandbox, not a FIPS 140-3 / CMVP-validated production HSM. Passing this exercise does not verify a deployed UEFI firmware verifier or production signing pipeline — validate HSM firmware, certificate chains, and target boot-verifier acceptance in your own hardware environment.
KAT note: These checks do not follow the algorithm selected above; they run fixed parameter sets. Rows tagged “NIST ACVP sample” compare the engine with an answer NIST published: ML-DSA-87 verification of a NIST reference signature; for both ML-DSA-87 and ML-DSA-65 (the default above) one NIST sigVer case that must verify and one that must be rejected (FIPS 204); verification of a NIST-generated SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature (FIPS 205); and SHA-256 and SHA-512 digests (FIPS 180-4). The other ML-DSA and SLH-DSA parameter sets are covered on the SLH-DSA page and in the Validation Workbench. The row tagged “Functional” (sign + verify round trip) generates a fresh key and only checks that the engine accepts its own signature, so it has no NIST expected value.
Secure Boot PQC Known Answer Tests
UEFI 2.11 · TPM 2.0 · FIPS 204 · FIPS 205 · FIPS 180-4
Predict a one-byte change
This fictional sample generates fresh ML-DSA-87 keys. Predict whether changing the selected byte should preserve verification or key confirmation, then run the actual operation.
Click Run known-answer checks to run 9 use-case scenarios. Evidence in this set: NIST ACVP-Server reference sample — Expected values copied from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository with immutable source identity; Functional round-trip — Output produced by an implementation is consumed by the same or paired implementation.
Reference samples from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository · UEFI 2.11 · TPM 2.0 · FIPS 204 · FIPS 205 · FIPS 180-4 · Generated keys are for educational use only.
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements
What this sample check establishes: Exercises post-quantum firmware image hashing, signature generation (`ML-DSA`, `SLH-DSA`, `LMS/HSS`), and tamper-detection verification.
Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Executes in browser WASM memory; it does not verify Boot ROM mask code, OTP fuse burning, or physical glitch/fault-injection resilience.
What to require and test in your production tools:
- Hardware Root of Trust (Boot ROM / MCU secure enclave) supporting SP 800-208 `LMS/HSS`, `XMSS`, or FIPS 204 `ML-DSA-87` signature verification.
- Monotonic anti-rollback security version number (SVN) counters stored in hardware fuses or RPMB/TPM.
- HSM signing appliance (FIPS 140 Level 3+, SP 800-208 §8) that stores the incremented leaf index in non-volatile memory before exporting any signature.
Try it
- 1. Predict before you run it.
- 2. Run or change the tool above.
- 3. Explain what the result shows.
The signing configuration says "pure mode, no caller pre-hash". In a CMS SignedData that uses signed attributes, what does RFC 9882 say the ML-DSA signer is given?
Next step
Turn it into a plan: Infrastructure Modernization PlannerThis tool practises the Secure Boot & Firmware PQC module, phase 6 (Infrastructure & Performance); Infrastructure Modernization Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.
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