HSM / PKCS#11 / SLH-DSA Sign & Verify

What you will do: Pick one of the 12 FIPS 205 parameter sets and a pre-hash mode, then Generate Key Pair, Sign Message and Verify Signature on a real PKCS#11 v3.2 HSM emulator in the browser.

Worked example: With the default SHA2-128s set the 32-byte public key appears, the message signs into a 7,856 B (7.7 KB) signature, Verify Signature reports Signature Valid, and the PKCS#11 call log lists every call.

Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.

Browse all Crypto Lab tools · Learn with SLH-DSA: Stateless Hash Signatures

For your role

Developer / Engineer
Pick a parameter set from the twelve FIPS 205 variants, keep Pure mode (the recommended default), then run 1. Generate Key Pair, 2. Sign Message and 3. Verify Signature: the PKCS#11 call log shows the exact C_GenerateKeyPair, C_Sign and C_Verify sequence your code would issue.
Security Architect
Compare SHA2-128s against the f variants and the 192/256 levels: the same message signs to very different signature sizes, and the Stateful vs Stateless comparison panel says when a stateless scheme is worth that size over LMS or XMSS.
Researcher / Academic
Open Algorithm checks to see the SLH-DSA sign and verify round trips (functional, no external expected value), a SHA-256 NIST reference sample and the NIST SLH-DSA sigVer reference cases run in-browser, then switch between Pure and pre-hash mode to see what changes on the wire.
Certification & Validation Engineer
Pick a parameter set from the twelve FIPS 205 variants, keep Pure mode, then run 1. Generate Key Pair, 2. Sign Message and 3. Verify Signature: the PKCS#11 call log is the exact sequence a test harness drives through the module interface.

Initializing SoftHSM…

C_Initialize → C_InitToken → C_OpenSession → C_Login

SLH-DSA Live Demo (FIPS 205)

Generate SLH-DSA key pairs, sign messages, and verify signatures using a real PKCS#11 v3.2 HSM emulator in-browser. SLH-DSA (standardized as FIPS 205, August 2024) is the NIST name for SPHINCS+. SLH-DSA is stateless: unlike LMS and XMSS (see the Stateful Hash Signatures module) there is no leaf counter to protect.

Enable Live WASM Mode above to generate real SLH-DSA keys, sign, and verify using the SoftHSM3 PKCS#11 v3.2 emulator.

Stateful vs Stateless Signature Comparison

  • Standard
    LMS
    SP 800-208 / RFC 8554
    SLH-DSA
    FIPS 205
    ML-DSA
    FIPS 204
  • Basis
    LMS
    Hash function
    SLH-DSA
    Hash function
    ML-DSA
    Lattice
  • Parameter set shown in the size rows
    LMS
    LMS_SHA256_M24_H10 / LMOTS_SHA256_N24_W4
    SLH-DSA
    SLH-DSA-SHA2-192s (category 3)
    ML-DSA
    ML-DSA-65 (category 3) and ML-DSA-87 (category 5)
  • Statefulness
    LMS
    Stateful
    SLH-DSA
    Stateless
    ML-DSA
    Stateless
  • Signing capacity / analysis scope
    LMS
    Bounded (2^h = 1,024 for h = 10)
    SLH-DSA
    At most 2^64 messages/key in the FIPS 205 §11 security analysis; no leaf counter
    ML-DSA
    No leaf-exhaustion counter (not an unlimited-use claim)
  • Public key
    LMS
    48 B
    SLH-DSA
    48 B
    ML-DSA
    1,952 B (-65); 2,592 B (-87)
  • Signature
    LMS
    1,500 B
    SLH-DSA
    16,224 B
    ML-DSA
    3,309 B (-65); 4,627 B (-87)
  • Signing speed
    LMS
    Fast
    SLH-DSA
    Slow
    ML-DSA
    Fast
  • CNSA 2.0
    LMS
    Single-tree LMS approved for firmware and software signing; LMS SHA-256/192 recommended; multi-tree HSS and XMSSMT not allowed (CNSA 2.0 FAQ)
    SLH-DSA
    Not approved for any use in NSS
    ML-DSA
    ML-DSA-87 only (the CNSA 2.0 table lists no other ML-DSA set)
  • Best use
    LMS
    Firmware, code signing (CNSA 2.0)
    SLH-DSA
    CA roots, stateless contexts, no persistent state
    ML-DSA
    TLS, general-purpose signing

The size rows compare named parameter sets of a similar size class, not equal security: SP 800-208 assigns no NIST security category to LMS. LMS sizes follow the RFC 8554 layouts (public key 4 + 4 + 16 + m bytes; signature 12 + n(p + 1) + m·h bytes) with the SP 800-208 SHA-256/192 parameters n = m = 24, p = 51, h = 10. An HSS key with one level, which is what the PKCS#11 engine signs with, adds 4 bytes to the public key and to each signature.

Why is SLH-DSA stateless? SLH-DSA keeps no counter. A key pair is a very large set of few-time FORS keys; each signature hashes the message with a randomizer, uses part of the digest to select one of them, and authenticates it through the hypertree. A FORS key can be selected again, and its security degrades gradually; the parameter sets are designed for up to 2^64 signatures per key. Because SLH-DSA keeps no counter, a copy of the private key cannot cause the one-time key reuse that NIST SP 800-208 section 9.1 warns about for LMS and XMSS. Signatures made by all copies of a key still count towards the same limit of 2^64 signatures per key (FIPS 205 section 11). FIPS 205 gives no rules for backing up or replicating keys, so follow your module's key-management requirements.

The cost of statefulness elimination: SLH-DSA (FIPS 205, formerly SPHINCS+) signs with a Merkle hypertree whose path proof must be included in full — producing signatures of 7–49 KB depending on the parameter set, versus 1.3–9.3 KB for LMS. The "s" variants optimize for smaller signatures; the "f" variants optimize for faster signing at the expense of larger output. Enable Live WASM Mode above for browser-sandbox cryptographic operations. Generated keys are for educational purposes only; validate key protection, signing-mode policy, and ACVP/CMVP compliance in your production hardware.

Algorithm checks: SLH-DSA

A known-answer check compares the engine's output with a value fixed in advance by a standard or by NIST. A functional round trip signs and verifies with the same engine, so it shows the pieces work together and nothing more.

Known-answer check: SHA-256

FIPS 180-4

Click Run reference sample to run 1 use-case scenario. Evidence in this set: NIST ACVP-Server reference sample — Expected values copied from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository with immutable source identity.

Reference samples from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository · FIPS 180-4 · Generated keys are for educational use only.

SLH-DSA signature verification: NIST ACVP reference sample

FIPS 205 · public NIST ACVP-Server sigVer cases · evidence level: NIST ACVP sample

Verifies a small set of published NIST SLH-DSA sigVer cases (valid signatures, and signatures NIST says must be rejected) with the in-browser engine and compares each answer with NIST's expected result.

Source: public NIST ACVP-Server, SLH-DSA-sigVer-FIPS205 (commit 975de31). Eight cases from two of its 36 test groups (SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s and SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s, pure, external interface). Pre-hash, internal-interface, key-generation and signature-generation vectors are not run here. These are reference samples, not vectors issued by an ACVTS test session: passing them establishes no validation.

Functional round trips (not known-answer tests)

FIPS 205 · each row signs and verifies with this engine, so a pass shows no external correctness claim

Click Run functional tests to run 2 use-case scenarios. Evidence in this set: Functional round-trip — Output produced by an implementation is consumed by the same or paired implementation.

FIPS 205 · each row signs and verifies with this engine, so a pass shows no external correctness claim · Generated keys are for educational use only.

Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements

What this sample check establishes: Runs real NIST FIPS 205 SLH-DSA key generation, signing, and verification across SHA2/SHAKE `-s` (small) and `-f` (fast) parameter sets in WASM.

Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Browser WASM timing depends on host CPU/JIT and does not establish hardware throughput or side-channel fault immunity.

What to require and test in your production tools:

  • CAVP-validated FIPS 205 `SLH-DSA` implementation supporting the SLH-DSA SHA2/SHAKE parameter sets your policy needs (`128s/f`, `192s/f`, `256s/f`) and RFC 9909 OIDs.
  • Context-string (`ctx`, 0–255 bytes, default empty) support per FIPS 205 §10.2.1 for domain separation.
  • Transport and storage buffers sized for 7,856 B (`128s`) up to 49,856 B (`256f`) signatures.

Try it

  1. 1. Predict before you run it.
  2. 2. Run or change the tool above.
  3. 3. Explain what the result shows.

Sign the same message with SHA2-128s and then a 128f variant. What changes?

A sample firmware signature was made with Pure SLH-DSA under the context update-v1. The release verifier requires update-v2. Which verification result should the release engineer expect?

Next step

Keep learning: SOC Implementation for PQC

SOC Implementation for PQC follows SLH-DSA: Stateless Hash Signatures, the module this tool practises, in the Software Infrastructure track.