HSM / PKCS#11 / Hybrid Signature Spectrums
What you will do: Choose Concatenation, Nesting or Silithium (Fused), then Generate Key Pairs, Sign the message and Verify to see whether the EC-Schnorr and ML-DSA-65 halves still verify once stripped apart.
Worked example: Concatenation verifies but both halves strip cleanly (Separable); with Silithium the Verification Results show EC-Schnorr alone and ML-DSA alone as Blocked, and Recombination Attack tries to reassemble the parts.
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For your role
- Developer / Engineer
- Choose Concatenation, Nesting or Silithium (Fused), then Generate Key Pairs, Sign and Verify on your message: the PKCS#11 trace shows the ML-DSA-65 calls through softhsmv3 and the description says whether a component signature can be stripped and verified alone.
- Security Architect
- The three modes differ in non-separability: concatenation offers none, nesting weak, Silithium strong; the Why hybrid signatures? panel and each mode's IETF reference are the basis for choosing one for a migration-period certificate.
- Researcher / Academic
- Sign the same message under all three constructions and compare signature layouts: the trace and the descriptions let you reproduce each composition and its separability property.
- Certification & Validation Engineer
- Sign one message under Concatenation, Nesting and Silithium (Fused): the PKCS#11 trace isolates the ML-DSA-65 calls — the primitive that algorithm testing covers — from the composition wrapped around them.
Hybrid Signature Spectrums
Compare concatenation, nesting, and Silithium — ranging from no non-separability to Strong Non-Separability (SNS).
Why hybrid signatures? — Migration context
During the PQC transition, systems must support verifiers that understand only classical algorithms (legacy) and verifiers that require post-quantum algorithms (future-safe). Hybrid signatures let one signed artifact satisfy both.
The critical security question is: what prevents an attacker from stripping the PQC component? If they can, the document is no longer quantum-safe — it degrades silently to classical security. This is the non-separability problem this tool demonstrates.
Standards: IETF draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs (Concatenation), draft-ietf-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums (Nesting/Silithium).
sig₁ ‖ sig₂Non-separability: None / WNSTwo independent signatures concatenated. Either component can be stripped and verified alone. Provides defence in depth but no separability resistance.
IETF draft §1.3.3Try it
Which construction lets a verifier strip one component signature and verify the other alone?
Next step
Turn it into a plan: Hybrid Transition PlannerThis tool practises the Hybrid Cryptography module, phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Hybrid Transition Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.
Related content
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