HSM / PKCS#11 / Hybrid Signature Spectrums
What you will do: Choose Concatenation, Nesting or Shared-binding model (Silithium-inspired), then Generate Key Pairs, Sign and Verify. Read the full-binding and raw-message EC/ML checks. The local model is not the published Silithium scheme, and this page does not claim strong non-separability or a security proof.
Worked example: With a valid local-model sample, both full-binding components pass while the separate raw-message checks do not. Recombination Attack retains the EC public key and original EC bytes while signing a replacement ML component with its own key: inspect the actual EC, ML and combined results.
Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.
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For your role
- Developer / Engineer
- Choose Concatenation, Nesting or Shared-binding model, then Generate Key Pairs, Sign and Verify. Compare the actual full-binding and raw-message EC/ML checks. Concatenation and nesting use the PKCS#11 trace for ML-DSA; the local shared-binding model runs in JavaScript and is not published Silithium or a security proof.
- Security Architect
- Compare the observed component checks and the public-only ML replacement experiment. The local shared-binding model is not published Silithium or a non-separability proof. For a production certificate decision, require a versioned standard/profile, relying-party compatibility checks and implementation evidence from your own tools.
- Researcher / Academic
- Sign the same message under all three options and compare measured layouts and actual checks. The local shared-binding model uses fresh random EC nonces; its public-only ML replacement experiment tests one binding case, not the published Silithium construction or a general non-separability property.
- Certification & Validation Engineer
- Sign one message under Concatenation, Nesting and Shared-binding model. The first two expose ML-DSA calls in the PKCS#11 trace; the local model uses provider-internal JavaScript operations outside that boundary. Its component/replacement outcomes are not published-scheme conformance or validation evidence. Evaluate the exact versioned standard/profile and implementation evidence with your production tools.
Hybrid Signature Spectrums
Compare concatenation, nesting, and a local shared-binding model. Observe component checks and a public-only replacement experiment; these do not establish a security proof.
Why hybrid signatures? — Migration context
During the PQC transition, systems must support verifiers that understand only classical algorithms (legacy) and verifiers that require post-quantum algorithms (future-safe). Hybrid signatures let one signed artifact satisfy both.
The critical security question is: what prevents an attacker from stripping the PQC component? If they can, the document is no longer quantum-safe — it degrades silently to classical security. This tool explores that question with component checks and a limited local binding experiment.
Standards: IETF RFC 10073 (a labelled concatenation, not the bare form shown here); RFC 9955, Hybrid Signature Spectrums (the concatenation, nesting and fused categories); ePrint 2025/2059 (Silithium). Profile distinction: RFC 10073 specifies Composite ML-DSA for X.509 PKI, whereas RFC 10082 specifies Composite ML-DSA for CMS / S/MIME.
sig₁ ‖ sig₂Non-separability: None / WNSBare concatenation, shown here with no label or prefix (RFC 9955 Table 2, case 1): either component can be stripped and verified alone. RFC 9955 (section 1.3.4) notes that concatenation with a label in the message gives weak non-separability; Composite ML-DSA (RFC 10073 section 9.2.3) works that way.
RFC 9955 §2@noble) — this is not a FIPS 140-3 / CMVP-validated production HSM or an interoperable RFC 10073 / RFC 10082 implementation. The local shared-binding model uses fresh random EC signing nonces and is inspired by ePrint 2025/2059 (Devevey, Guerreau, Roméas). Its approximation uses ML-DSA external-μ operations; it is not the published scheme or its security proof. Validate target profiles, HSM support, and relying-party verification in your production environment.Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements
What this sample check establishes: Demonstrates composite and dual classical + PQC digital signature generation and verification where both `ECDSA`/`Ed25519` and `ML-DSA` must verify.
Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Executes in browser memory; it does not test third-party X.509 path-validation engines or legacy middlebox ASN.1 parsers.
What to require and test in your production tools:
- IETF RFC 10073 (Composite ML-DSA) OID support and strict AND-verification semantics (both component signatures must pass).
- Prefix/Label domain separation as defined in RFC 10073 §2.2 and §9.4, and no reuse of component keys outside the composite (RFC 10073 §9.4 MUST).
- Negative test verification confirming that corrupting either the classical or the ML-DSA component causes overall verification failure.
Try it
- 1. Predict before you run it.
- 2. Run or change the tool above.
- 3. Explain what the result shows.
In this sample, which construction verifies BOTH raw-message component signatures independently?
A verifier expects a hybrid signature under a both-components policy. It verifies the classical signature but the post-quantum signature fails. What should the application report?
Next step
Turn it into a plan: Hybrid Transition PlannerThis tool practises the Hybrid Cryptography module, phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Hybrid Transition Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.
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