HSM / PKCS#11 / SP 800-108 KDF
What you will do: Generate a local key shaped like an ETSI QKD 014 response and import it into the browser HSM. Compare SP 800-108 counter-mode derivations with the same session context and a one-bit change.
Worked example: Run the local HSM sample. Repeating the same inputs reproduces the key. Changing the session context gives a different key from the same imported secret and label.
Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.
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For your role
- Developer / Engineer
- Press Fetch QKD Key to start from the ETSI QKD 014 REST step, then follow the SP 800-108 counter-mode derivation: the label and context inputs are what bind the derived key to one purpose, and the same call applies to a KEM shared secret or a PSK.
- Security Architect
- Read KBKDF vs HKDF — Choosing the Right KDF before the run: it says when SP 800-108 counter mode and when HKDF is the right choice for splitting one master secret into encryption, MAC and IV keys.
- Researcher / Academic
- Open What runs live vs. simulated? to see that the QKD retrieval is a modelled REST exchange while the derivation runs in the PKCS#11 log; the QKD/HSM PQC Known Answer Tests panel runs the KDF checks and labels each result with its evidence class.
- Certification & Validation Engineer
- Follow the SP 800-108 counter-mode derivation in the PKCS#11 log, then run the QKD/HSM PQC Known Answer Tests panel: each KDF check carries its evidence class, and What runs live vs. simulated? says the QKD retrieval is modelled.
Local sample workflow: key retrieval is simulated and browser WASM (SoftHSM3) is an educational sandbox, not a FIPS 140-3 / CMVP-validated production HSM. Successful optional PKCS#11 calls are separate from the walkthrough; no QKD network or second peer runs. The sample secret and any returned key bytes are visible in browser memory. This is not a non-exportability test.
Live HSM Mode Active
SoftHSM3 · PKCS#11 v3.2 · Rust · session open
SP 800-108 Key Derivation — Beyond QKD
NIST SP 800-108 counter-mode KDF is a universal primitive used wherever a master secret must produce multiple purpose-specific keys. This demo uses QKD as the input source, but the same KDF applies to:
KBKDF vs HKDF — Choosing the Right KDF
Both mechanism support and key attributes depend on the actual tool and configuration. This sample imports an extractable session secret and reads derived bytes back into JavaScript. It does not establish that KBKDF or HKDF keeps keys inside a production HSM. Evaluate supported mechanisms, attributes, output policy and failure behavior in your own tools.
QKD scenario below: This demo follows the ETSI GS QKD 014 key retrieval API → PKCS#11 v3.0 HSM import → NIST SP 800-108 related key-derivation concepts. The network retrieval and second peer are not executed. Evaluate mutual authentication, delivered-key correlation, token attributes and actual protocol integration with production tools.
Step 1: Local Key-Delivery Illustration
POST /api/v1/keys/{slave_SAE_ID}/enc_keysPeer: POST /api/v1/keys/{master_SAE_ID}/dec_keys with delivered key_IDsSAE and KME authenticate certificates and identities using mutual TLS before API use. A certificate is not an HTTP bearer token. This button only generates local random sample bytes and JSON; it contacts no key manager or QKD hardware.
QKD/HSM PQC Known Answer Tests
ETSI GS QKD 014 · NIST FIPS 198-1 (HMAC-SHA-256) · SP 800-108r1 + RFC 5869 (HKDF)
Click Run known-answer checks to run 2 use-case scenarios. Evidence in this set: NIST ACVP-Server reference sample — Expected values copied from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository with immutable source identity; Published standard KAT — Expected values printed in a cited standard or consensus RFC.
Reference samples from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository · ETSI GS QKD 014 · NIST FIPS 198-1 (HMAC-SHA-256) · SP 800-108r1 + RFC 5869 (HKDF) · Generated keys are for educational use only.
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements
What this sample check establishes: Demonstrates HKDF (RFC 5869), SP 800-108, and SP 800-56C / SP 800-227 key derivation combining classical ECDH and post-quantum ML-KEM shared secrets with context labels.
Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Runs in browser WASM/WebCrypto; it does not enforce hardware key-isolation attributes on derived keys.
What to require and test in your production tools:
- SP 800-227 / ETSI TS 103 744 compliant hybrid KDF combiner, preferably one that binds ciphertexts, encapsulation keys and a domain separator into the derivation (SP 800-227 §4.6.2).
- HSM PKCS#11 v3.2 key derivation (`CKM_HKDF_DERIVE` / SP 800-108) keeping derived traffic/wrapping keys inside the HSM boundary when required.
- Immediate zeroization of intermediate shared secrets (`Z_ecdh`, `Z_mlkem`) after key derivation.
Try it
- 1. Predict before you run it.
- 2. Run or change the tool above.
- 3. Explain what the result shows.
What binds the derived session key to its purpose in the SP 800-108 step?
Next step
Turn it into a plan: Infrastructure Modernization PlannerThis tool practises the KMS & PQC Key Management module, phase 6 (Infrastructure & Performance); Infrastructure Modernization Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.
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