Entropy & Random / SP 800-90A DRBG
What you will do: Instantiate HMAC_DRBG from a 32-byte entropy input, a nonce and a personalization string, then press Generate and Reseed while the Internal State Tracker shows the working key K, state value V and reseed_counter. Run the known-answer check to compare the same code with NIST vectors.
Worked example: Instantiate with the default personalization string and generate 32 bytes ten times: reseed_counter reaches 11, above the demo interval of 10, so a Reseed required banner blocks Generate until you press Reseed, which resets it to 1.
Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.
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For your role
- Developer / Engineer
- Set the bytes and optional additional input, Generate several times and Reseed: the state tracker shows what your DRBG wrapper must keep between calls and when reseeding changes the output.
- Security Architect
- Instantiate HMAC_DRBG with a personalization string, then Generate and Reseed: the Internal State Tracker shows the Key and V vectors ratcheting, which is why a DRBG can be seeded once and reseeded on a schedule.
- Researcher / Academic
- Run the known-answer check: 16 NIST HMAC_DRBG vectors must match byte for byte and a one-bit flip in one entropy input must not — evidence the SP 800-90A Rev. 1 mechanism is computed correctly, and none about the entropy input.
- Certification & Validation Engineer
- Run the known-answer check: 16 NIST HMAC_DRBG vectors must match byte for byte and a one-bit flip must not — algorithm evidence for SP 800-90A Rev. 1, and none about the entropy input that seeds it.
SP 800-90A HMAC_DRBG
Explore the internal lifecycle of a Deterministic Random Bit Generator. This is HMAC_DRBG with SHA-256 as specified in SP 800-90A Rev. 1 §10.1.2: the working state is the Key and V values plus a reseed counter, and every step updates them with HMAC-SHA-256.
The steps shown here are the HMAC_DRBG algorithms for Instantiate (§10.1.2.3), Generate (§10.1.2.5) and Reseed (§10.1.2.4).
A DRBG is not an entropy source: its output is only as unpredictable as the entropy input it was seeded with. Here the entropy input comes from the browser’s crypto.getRandomValues() as a stand-in. In SP 800-90C (section 2.2, Table 1) an RBG2 or RBG3 seeds its DRBG from entropy sources validated under SP 800-90B; an RBG1 is seeded once by another RBG (an RBG2(P), an RBG3 or a root RBGC).
Standards status checked 18 November 2026: this exercise implements SP 800-90A Rev. 1, which remains NIST's final publication; Rev. 2 is still an initial preliminary draft. Final SP 800-90C (2025) describes how DRBG mechanisms from 90A are used with entropy sources from 90B. NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1 · Rev. 2 pre-draft · NIST SP 800-90C.
1Instantiate Phase
2Generate & Reseed
Instantiate the DRBG first; Generate and Reseed unlock once it has a state.
Internal State Tracker
Known-answer check (NIST HMAC_DRBG vectors)
Runs the same HMAC_DRBG code used above on 16 pinned SHA-256 vectors — 4 from NIST’s ACVP-Server hmacDRBG-1.0 sample set and 12 from the NIST CAVP HMAC_DRBG.rsp files. They cover prediction resistance on and off, reseed, and empty or non-empty personalization strings and additional input. Each output must equal the published answer byte for byte. The check then flips one bit in each input of two vectors — entropy input, nonce, personalization string, additional input, reseed entropy and additional input, and prediction-resistance entropy; every one of those runs must not match.
What a pass shows: this browser code computes the SP 800-90A Rev. 1 HMAC_DRBG mechanism correctly for these inputs. What it does not show: it is not a CAVP/ACVP algorithm validation, it is not an entropy-source test, and it says nothing about the quality of any entropy input.
Site version 4.216.0 · commit db972876f4fa
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Source Combining
See where a DRBG's entropy input comes from: health-test raw source samples, condition them, and state the assumptions a combined construction depends on.
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements
What this sample check establishes: Demonstrates NIST SP 800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (`HMAC_DRBG` / `CTR_DRBG`) state transitions: `Instantiate`, `Reseed`, `Generate`, and prediction resistance.
Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Educational state visualizer in the browser; production DRBGs should execute inside a validated cryptographic module boundary (FIPS 140-3).
What to require and test in your production tools:
- CAVP-validated NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1 DRBG instantiated at 256-bit security strength (`AES-256 CTR_DRBG` or `SHA-512 Hash/HMAC_DRBG`).
- Reseed intervals at or below the SP 800-90A limit of 2^48 requests, and, as good practice, a prediction-resistance reseed before high-value PQC Root CA key generation.
- Zeroization of internal DRBG working state (`V`, `Key` / `C`) upon uninstantiation or error.
Try it
- 1. Predict before you run it.
- 2. Run or change the tool above.
- 3. Explain what the result shows.
Instantiate the HMAC_DRBG, Generate twice, then Reseed. What changes in the Internal State Tracker?
Next step
Keep learning: PQC 101PQC 101 follows Entropy & Randomness, the module this tool practises, in the Foundations track.
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