Entropy & Random / SP 800-90A DRBG

What you will do: Instantiate HMAC_DRBG from a 32-byte entropy input, a nonce and a personalization string, then press Generate and Reseed while the Internal State Tracker shows the working key K, state value V and reseed_counter. Run the known-answer check to compare the same code with NIST vectors.

Worked example: Instantiate with the default personalization string and generate 32 bytes ten times: reseed_counter reaches 11, above the demo interval of 10, so a Reseed required banner blocks Generate until you press Reseed, which resets it to 1.

Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.

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For your role

Developer / Engineer
Set the bytes and optional additional input, Generate several times and Reseed: the state tracker shows what your DRBG wrapper must keep between calls and when reseeding changes the output.
Security Architect
Instantiate HMAC_DRBG with a personalization string, then Generate and Reseed: the Internal State Tracker shows the Key and V vectors ratcheting, which is why a DRBG can be seeded once and reseeded on a schedule.
Researcher / Academic
Run the known-answer check: 16 NIST HMAC_DRBG vectors must match byte for byte and a one-bit flip in one entropy input must not — evidence the SP 800-90A Rev. 1 mechanism is computed correctly, and none about the entropy input.
Certification & Validation Engineer
Run the known-answer check: 16 NIST HMAC_DRBG vectors must match byte for byte and a one-bit flip must not — algorithm evidence for SP 800-90A Rev. 1, and none about the entropy input that seeds it.

SP 800-90A HMAC_DRBG

Explore the internal lifecycle of a Deterministic Random Bit Generator. This is HMAC_DRBG with SHA-256 as specified in SP 800-90A Rev. 1 §10.1.2: the working state is the Key and V values plus a reseed counter, and every step updates them with HMAC-SHA-256.

The steps shown here are the HMAC_DRBG algorithms for Instantiate (§10.1.2.3), Generate (§10.1.2.5) and Reseed (§10.1.2.4).

A DRBG is not an entropy source: its output is only as unpredictable as the entropy input it was seeded with. Here the entropy input comes from the browser’s crypto.getRandomValues() as a stand-in. In SP 800-90C (section 2.2, Table 1) an RBG2 or RBG3 seeds its DRBG from entropy sources validated under SP 800-90B; an RBG1 is seeded once by another RBG (an RBG2(P), an RBG3 or a root RBGC).

Standards status checked 18 November 2026: this exercise implements SP 800-90A Rev. 1, which remains NIST's final publication; Rev. 2 is still an initial preliminary draft. Final SP 800-90C (2025) describes how DRBG mechanisms from 90A are used with entropy sources from 90B. NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1 · Rev. 2 pre-draft · NIST SP 800-90C.

1Instantiate Phase

Entropy Input (32 bytes)
74ee55dbe6de53590975d67227b7cd30470682414ac8ed532d5db9bf808f9e2f
Nonce — auto (16 bytes)
da17dc73ff9e44f2cbd6de975f412cc4

2Generate & Reseed

Instantiate the DRBG first; Generate and Reseed unlock once it has a state.

Internal State Tracker

reseed_counter: 0
Instantiate DRBG to start tracking state
Working Key (K)
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
State Value (V)
0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101

Known-answer check (NIST HMAC_DRBG vectors)

Runs the same HMAC_DRBG code used above on 16 pinned SHA-256 vectors — 4 from NIST’s ACVP-Server hmacDRBG-1.0 sample set and 12 from the NIST CAVP HMAC_DRBG.rsp files. They cover prediction resistance on and off, reseed, and empty or non-empty personalization strings and additional input. Each output must equal the published answer byte for byte. The check then flips one bit in each input of two vectors — entropy input, nonce, personalization string, additional input, reseed entropy and additional input, and prediction-resistance entropy; every one of those runs must not match.

What a pass shows: this browser code computes the SP 800-90A Rev. 1 HMAC_DRBG mechanism correctly for these inputs. What it does not show: it is not a CAVP/ACVP algorithm validation, it is not an entropy-source test, and it says nothing about the quality of any entropy input.

Site version 4.216.0 · commit db972876f4fa

Next in sequence

Source Combining

See where a DRBG's entropy input comes from: health-test raw source samples, condition them, and state the assumptions a combined construction depends on.

Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements

What this sample check establishes: Demonstrates NIST SP 800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator (`HMAC_DRBG` / `CTR_DRBG`) state transitions: `Instantiate`, `Reseed`, `Generate`, and prediction resistance.

Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Educational state visualizer in the browser; production DRBGs should execute inside a validated cryptographic module boundary (FIPS 140-3).

What to require and test in your production tools:

  • CAVP-validated NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1 DRBG instantiated at 256-bit security strength (`AES-256 CTR_DRBG` or `SHA-512 Hash/HMAC_DRBG`).
  • Reseed intervals at or below the SP 800-90A limit of 2^48 requests, and, as good practice, a prediction-resistance reseed before high-value PQC Root CA key generation.
  • Zeroization of internal DRBG working state (`V`, `Key` / `C`) upon uninstantiation or error.

Try it

  1. 1. Predict before you run it.
  2. 2. Run or change the tool above.
  3. 3. Explain what the result shows.

Instantiate the HMAC_DRBG, Generate twice, then Reseed. What changes in the Internal State Tracker?

Next step

Keep learning: PQC 101

PQC 101 follows Entropy & Randomness, the module this tool practises, in the Foundations track.

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