HSM / PKCS#11 / Hybrid KEM + ECDH

What you will do: Execute six steps in order: Alice and Bob X25519 keypairs, ECDH in both directions, an ML-KEM-768 keypair, encapsulation, then decapsulate and HKDF-combine both secrets into one 32-byte session key.

Worked example: Step 3 prints both ECDH secrets and confirms they match; Step 5 shows the 1088-byte ciphertext; Step 6 lists the HKDF inputs (ECDH secret, ML-KEM secret, info string) and the final 32-byte hybrid key.

Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.

Browse all Crypto Lab tools · Learn with Hybrid Cryptography

For your role

Developer / Engineer
Walk the six steps from Generate Alice Keypair to the HKDF-SHA-256 combiner: each step's Field / Value / Description table names the PKCS#11 mechanism your code calls for X25519, ML-KEM-768 encapsulation and the final 32-byte session key.
Security Architect
The combiner is the design point: both the X25519 and the ML-KEM-768 secrets feed HKDF, so the session key stays secure if either component survives, and the step tables show the size each component adds to the exchange.
Researcher / Academic
Follow the mechanism and key-handle columns through the six steps to reproduce the exchange outside the browser; the PKCS#11 call log records every call with its return code.

Live HSM Mode Active

SoftHSM3 · PKCS#11 v3.2 · Rust · session open

Hybrid Key Establishment (X25519 + ML-KEM-768)

Live PKCS#11 demo: X25519 ECDH + ML-KEM-768 encapsulation + HKDF-SHA-256 over the concatenated secrets (ML-KEM first, as RFC 10024 §4.3 orders X25519MLKEM768). Both secrets contribute to the 32-byte hybrid session key, which stays secret as long as either component is unbroken, given an approved combiner form such as concatenation into an HKDF (FIPS 203 · RFC 5869).

STEP 1 OF 6

Step 1 — Alice X25519 Keypair

Alice generates an ephemeral X25519 (Curve25519) keypair. The 32-byte public key will be shared with Bob for ECDH key agreement.

MechanismCKM_EC_MONTGOMERY_KEY_PAIR_GEN (0x1056)

PKCS#11 v3.2 mechanism for Curve25519/Curve448 keypair generation

CurveX25519 (Curve25519)

Montgomery-form elliptic curve; public key is the 32-byte u-coordinate

CKA_DERIVEtrue

Key is authorized for CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE — required for ECDH key agreement

Public Key Size32 bytes

Compact vs 65 bytes for an uncompressed P-256 public key

TERMINAL OUTPUT
Click Execute to run this step.

Combiner comparison. After you run Step 6, this spot shows the same two shared secrets combined three ways: this demo's HKDF, X-Wing (also the composite ML-KEM MLKEM768-X25519 formula), and plain concatenation.

Enable the HSM toggle and execute steps to see PKCS#11 traces.

Why combine ECDH and ML-KEM?

A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) is a one-sided primitive: the sender gives Encaps the receiver's public key and gets back a shared secret and a ciphertext, rather than supplying a key of its own choosing.

Combining X25519 ECDH with ML-KEM-768 via HKDF provides defense-in-depth:

  • If a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer (CRQC) breaks X25519 via Shor's algorithm, the ML-KEM shared secret remains secret.
  • If ML-KEM-768 has an unforeseen algebraic weakness, the X25519 shared secret remains secret.

What this construction does and does not do: its combiner has the form CMVP IG D.S accepts (both secrets concatenated and fed into an SP 800-56C KDF, HKDF included), but it mixes in only the two secrets and a fixed label, not the exchanged key shares or public keys. Deployed combiners bind those too (X-Wing hashes the X25519 key share and public key into its output; TLS 1.3 feeds the whole handshake transcript into its key schedule). A validated module must also enforce a fixed set of hybrid schemes and control the concatenation order itself, which this demo does not, so treat it as the idea, not a design to copy.

Then watch the same idea in a real TLS 1.3 handshake → The TLS simulator negotiates the X25519MLKEM768 group with real OpenSSL.

Note: softhsmv3 WASM is an in-browser educational PKCS#11 v3.2 sandbox (not a FIPS 140-3 CMVP-validated production HSM). It uses X25519 (Montgomery) for the classical leg via CKM_EC_MONTGOMERY_KEY_PAIR_GEN + CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE. Keys generated here are for learning only — in production, verify your HSM's active FIPS 140-3 CMVP certificate, Security Policy, and supported hybrid combiner profile.

Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements

What this sample check establishes: Executes real in-browser ECDH (X25519 / P-256) + FIPS 203 ML-KEM encapsulation, combining both shared secrets through a KDF combiner to derive an AES-256-GCM key.

Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Browser WASM/WebCrypto execution lacks constant-time hardware guarantees, side-channel protection, and FIPS 140-3 validated module boundaries.

What to require and test in your production tools:

  • PQ/T hybrid KEM combiner built from an SP 800-56C-approved key-derivation method (SP 800-227 §4.6.2; ETSI TS 103 744), using HKDF-SHA256/384 or KMAC256; IETF RFC 9794 supplies the terminology.
  • FIPS 203 §7.2 encapsulation-key (modulus) check, and implicit rejection in decapsulation (§6.3/§7.3), on tampered ML-KEM ciphertexts.
  • Authenticated encryption (AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305) with strict nonce-uniqueness enforcement.

Try it

  1. 1. Predict before you run it.
  2. 2. Run or change the tool above.
  3. 3. Explain what the result shows.

In the six steps, where do the X25519 secret and the ML-KEM-768 secret meet?

The recipient can derive the classical contribution to a hybrid envelope, but its recovered post-quantum contribution is different. The envelope uses both in the key derivation. What should happen?

Next step

Turn it into a plan: Hybrid Transition Planner

This tool practises the Hybrid Cryptography module, phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Hybrid Transition Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.