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Secure Boot & Firmware PQC

Migrate UEFI Secure Boot, firmware signing, and hardware root of trust to post-quantum cryptography. Covers ML-DSA-65 firmware signatures, TPM 2.0 key hierarchies, UEFI db/KEK/PK migration, and BIOS vendor roadmaps.

Why this matters: Secure Boot is the root of the whole chain of trust — a quantum-broken PK/KEK/db hierarchy doesn't just compromise one signature, it compromises every attestation built on top of it.

Start here: Expand any key in the UEFI hierarchy (PK, KEK, db) and press Analyze PQC Requirements: each key gets a risk level, finding and PQC action, plus the db storage impact of ML-DSA-65 certificates.

For your role

Security Architect
Analyse the UEFI PK, KEK and db hierarchy, explore TPM 2.0 key hierarchies with the hybrid RSA TPM plus ML-DSA approach, and design attestation flows for Measured Boot, TPM Quote and DICE.
Researcher / Academic
The vendor readiness comparison across AMI, Insyde, EDK2 and Dell and the live TPM 2.0 V1.85 key generation in the sandbox are the current state of firmware PQC; the TPM playground runs the commands.
Certification & Validation Engineer
Start with 'What the lab tests', inside 'ML-DSA-65 for Firmware Signature Migration' on the Learn tab: it separates the verifier on the device (algorithm tests) from the signer that holds the private key (module rules), and the SP 800-193 box after it covers the integrity checks around the signature. The UEFI PK, KEK and db hierarchy and the Measured Boot, TPM Quote and DICE attestation flows show where a PQC signature verifier sits in firmware; the vendor readiness comparison shows who ships one today.
IT Ops / DevOps
Walk the four-step ML-DSA-65 firmware signing migration from inventory onward: it is the rollout across the fleet, and the vendor comparison says which firmware can take it.
Practice in the Simulation

Secure Boot establishes a cryptographic chain of trust from hardware power-on through the OS kernel. Each stage must be verified by a trusted key before it executes. The hierarchy is: Platform Key (PK) → Key Exchange Key (KEK) → Authorized Signature Database (db) → Bootloader/Kernel signatures.

All UEFI Signing Keys Are Quantum-Vulnerable

In this module's reading, every RSA-2048 and ECDSA key in the UEFI Secure Boot hierarchy can be broken by a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) via Shor's algorithm. This is a forgery risk (“trust now, forge later”), not a harvest-now-decrypt-later one: a signature protects no secret, so nothing recorded today is exposed later. Once a CRQC exists, anyone who holds a public key (the verifying keys are stored on every device) could derive its private key and sign firmware that existing devices accept — enabling undetectable firmware rootkits. How urgent that is depends on how long the device and its trust anchors stay in the field. NSA's CNSA 2.0 FAQ (v2.2, p.13) notes that in many firmware-signing cases the validation algorithm is not easily updated, so firmware-signing algorithms are “frequently locked in for the life of a system”. Harvest-now-decrypt-later applies to confidentiality, such as the TLS key exchange that carries remote attestation, not to signatures.

UEFI Key Hierarchy Summary

ML-DSA-65 is this module's general-purpose target (NIST Security Level 3). For National Security Systems (NSS), the NSA's CNSA 2.0 FAQ (Ver. 2.2, p. 7–8) specifies ML-DSA-87 for all classification levels and allows LMS and XMSS (NIST SP 800-208) for signing firmware and software; HSS and XMSSMT are not allowed and SLH-DSA is not approved for NSS (p. 11). The CNSA 2.0 / NSS column shows the NSS choice.

  • PK
    Owner
    OEM / Platform Manufacturer
    Current
    RSA-2048 or RSA-4096
    PQC Target
    ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)
    CNSA 2.0 / NSS
    ML-DSA-87; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) where the key signs firmware or software
    Priority
    critical
  • KEK
    Owner
    OS Vendor / OEM
    Current
    RSA-2048
    PQC Target
    ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)
    CNSA 2.0 / NSS
    ML-DSA-87; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) where the key signs firmware or software
    Priority
    critical
  • db
    Owner
    OS Vendor / Software Publisher
    Current
    RSA-2048 certificates
    PQC Target
    ML-DSA-65 X.509 certificates
    CNSA 2.0 / NSS
    ML-DSA-87 certificates; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) for firmware or software signatures
    Priority
    high
  • dbx
    Owner
    UEFI Forum / OEM / OS Vendor
    Current
    Image digests and certificate revocation records
    PQC Target
    Preserve applicable revocation records
    CNSA 2.0 / NSS
    SHA-384 or SHA-512 (CNSA 2.0 hash algorithms)
    Priority
    low
  • MOK
    Owner
    Machine Owner / Admin
    Current
    RSA-2048 or RSA-4096
    PQC Target
    ML-DSA-65 (when shim supports FIPS 204)
    CNSA 2.0 / NSS
    ML-DSA-87 (when shim supports FIPS 204)
    Priority
    medium

The db size impact is a key operational concern: a minimal self-signed ML-DSA-65 X.509 certificate is about 5.5 KB (5,538 bytes) against about 0.8 KB (809 bytes) for RSA-2048, measured with OpenSSL 3.6.3. Certificates with more fields are larger. Secure Boot variable storage is platform-specific; firmware reports it through QueryVariableInfo() (UEFI 2.11 section 8.2.4). A full PQC db migration may require platform NVRAM reallocation — verify UEFI NVRAM capacity before planning.

Boot Chain: Signing Surfaces
1
UEFI FirmwareRSA-2048 with SHA-256

Vendor statements differ: see the Firmware Vendor Matrix (Intel Boot Guard, AMI, Insyde)

2
UEFI Secure Boot ValidationRSA-2048 or RSA-4096 EFI signature list

Image checks need firmware that supports the algorithm and db entries that use it; PK and KEK (update authorization) are migrated as a separate step. The UEFI Specification 2.10 Secure Boot section read here names no post-quantum signature type, so check the current specification and your firmware vendor.

3
Bootloader (GRUB2 / systemd-boot / shim)RSA-2048 (shim) + ECDSA P-384 (GRUB2 signing)

GRUB2 PQC support planned. Shim: no release note up to 16.1 (13 August 2025) mentions post-quantum signatures; check the shim project for current status

4
OS KernelRSA-4096 (Linux kernel signing)

ML-DSA kernel module signing is in mainline Linux from 7.0 (X.509 and PKCS#7); IMA/EVM ML-DSA signature verification from 7.2.

5
Kernel Modules & DriversRSA-2048 or RSA-4096

Dependent on kernel signing migration; follows OS kernel timeline

Related Resources

Products shown here are a representative selection — not an exhaustive list. For the full vendor landscape with PQC readiness status, visit the Tools & Products tab in this module or browse the Migrate catalog →

Analyze UEFI key hierarchies, migrate firmware signatures, and explore TPM attestation flows.

Check off all sections and mark this reading done.

In the Industry Landscape

Check your understanding

15 questions on Secure Boot & Firmware PQC, each with its answer and the reason.

Take the quiz

Next step

Practice it: Firmware Signing

Firmware Signing is the hands-on version of this module: the same ideas, run in your browser.

Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Checklist

Capabilities to require in your production tools:

  • Immutable Boot ROM / OTP fuse root-of-trust verifying `LMS/HSS` (NIST SP 800-208), `XMSS`, or `ML-DSA-87` (CNSA 2.0) signatures before executing first-stage bootloaders.
  • UEFI Secure Boot (`db`, `KEK`, `PK`) and Linux `IMA`/`kmod` signature verification supporting post-quantum X.509/PKCS#7 structures.
  • Anti-rollback monotonic fuse/TPM counter enforcement preventing downgrade to classical-signed bootloader versions.

How to evaluate in your environment

Test boot verification of a validly signed PQC bootloader image and verify hard boot halt when 1 byte of the image or signature is modified or an older SVN is loaded.

Production evidence to collect

OTP root-key hash provisioning record, UART boot verification log, and negative tamper/rollback halt test receipt.

Completing this Hub module and its browser-based sample exercises teaches the technical and governance decision criteria for your role; it does not test, validate, or certify your deployed production systems.

Record evidence for your environment

Identify the tested build and configuration. Use reference IDs for observations. For a proposed exclusion, record the system boundary or rule and why it excludes this build.

Immutable Boot ROM / OTP fuse root-of-trust verifying `LMS/HSS` (NIST SP 800-208), `XMSS`, or `ML-DSA-87` (CNSA 2.0) signatures before executing first-stage bootloaders.
UEFI Secure Boot (`db`, `KEK`, `PK`) and Linux `IMA`/`kmod` signature verification supporting post-quantum X.509/PKCS#7 structures.
Anti-rollback monotonic fuse/TPM counter enforcement preventing downgrade to classical-signed bootloader versions.

Evidence missing. 0 of 3 requirements have a reference or scope rationale.

Learning module content can be inaccurate. Please double-check its information. Report inaccuracies in PQC Today GitHub Discussions.