Secure Boot & Firmware PQC
Migrate UEFI Secure Boot, firmware signing, and hardware root of trust to post-quantum cryptography. Covers ML-DSA-65 firmware signatures, TPM 2.0 key hierarchies, UEFI db/KEK/PK migration, and BIOS vendor roadmaps.
Why this matters: Secure Boot is the root of the whole chain of trust — a quantum-broken PK/KEK/db hierarchy doesn't just compromise one signature, it compromises every attestation built on top of it.
Start here: Expand any key in the UEFI hierarchy (PK, KEK, db) and press Analyze PQC Requirements: each key gets a risk level, finding and PQC action, plus the db storage impact of ML-DSA-65 certificates.
For your role
- Security Architect
- Analyse the UEFI PK, KEK and db hierarchy, explore TPM 2.0 key hierarchies with the hybrid RSA TPM plus ML-DSA approach, and design attestation flows for Measured Boot, TPM Quote and DICE.
- Researcher / Academic
- The vendor readiness comparison across AMI, Insyde, EDK2 and Dell and the live TPM 2.0 V1.85 key generation in the sandbox are the current state of firmware PQC; the TPM playground runs the commands.
- Certification & Validation Engineer
- Start with 'What the lab tests', inside 'ML-DSA-65 for Firmware Signature Migration' on the Learn tab: it separates the verifier on the device (algorithm tests) from the signer that holds the private key (module rules), and the SP 800-193 box after it covers the integrity checks around the signature. The UEFI PK, KEK and db hierarchy and the Measured Boot, TPM Quote and DICE attestation flows show where a PQC signature verifier sits in firmware; the vendor readiness comparison shows who ships one today.
- IT Ops / DevOps
- Walk the four-step ML-DSA-65 firmware signing migration from inventory onward: it is the rollout across the fleet, and the vendor comparison says which firmware can take it.
Secure Boot establishes a cryptographic chain of trust from hardware power-on through the OS kernel. Each stage must be verified by a trusted key before it executes. The hierarchy is: Platform Key (PK) → Key Exchange Key (KEK) → Authorized Signature Database (db) → Bootloader/Kernel signatures.
In this module's reading, every RSA-2048 and ECDSA key in the UEFI Secure Boot hierarchy can be broken by a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) via Shor's algorithm. This is a forgery risk (“trust now, forge later”), not a harvest-now-decrypt-later one: a signature protects no secret, so nothing recorded today is exposed later. Once a CRQC exists, anyone who holds a public key (the verifying keys are stored on every device) could derive its private key and sign firmware that existing devices accept — enabling undetectable firmware rootkits. How urgent that is depends on how long the device and its trust anchors stay in the field. NSA's CNSA 2.0 FAQ (v2.2, p.13) notes that in many firmware-signing cases the validation algorithm is not easily updated, so firmware-signing algorithms are “frequently locked in for the life of a system”. Harvest-now-decrypt-later applies to confidentiality, such as the TLS key exchange that carries remote attestation, not to signatures.
ML-DSA-65 is this module's general-purpose target (NIST Security Level 3). For National Security Systems (NSS), the NSA's CNSA 2.0 FAQ (Ver. 2.2, p. 7–8) specifies ML-DSA-87 for all classification levels and allows LMS and XMSS (NIST SP 800-208) for signing firmware and software; HSS and XMSSMT are not allowed and SLH-DSA is not approved for NSS (p. 11). The CNSA 2.0 / NSS column shows the NSS choice.
- PK
- Owner
- OEM / Platform Manufacturer
- Current
- RSA-2048 or RSA-4096
- PQC Target
- ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)
- CNSA 2.0 / NSS
- ML-DSA-87; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) where the key signs firmware or software
- Priority
- critical
- KEK
- Owner
- OS Vendor / OEM
- Current
- RSA-2048
- PQC Target
- ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204)
- CNSA 2.0 / NSS
- ML-DSA-87; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) where the key signs firmware or software
- Priority
- critical
- db
- Owner
- OS Vendor / Software Publisher
- Current
- RSA-2048 certificates
- PQC Target
- ML-DSA-65 X.509 certificates
- CNSA 2.0 / NSS
- ML-DSA-87 certificates; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) for firmware or software signatures
- Priority
- high
- dbx
- Owner
- UEFI Forum / OEM / OS Vendor
- Current
- Image digests and certificate revocation records
- PQC Target
- Preserve applicable revocation records
- CNSA 2.0 / NSS
- SHA-384 or SHA-512 (CNSA 2.0 hash algorithms)
- Priority
- low
- MOK
- Owner
- Machine Owner / Admin
- Current
- RSA-2048 or RSA-4096
- PQC Target
- ML-DSA-65 (when shim supports FIPS 204)
- CNSA 2.0 / NSS
- ML-DSA-87 (when shim supports FIPS 204)
- Priority
- medium
| Key | Owner | Current | PQC Target | CNSA 2.0 / NSS | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PK | OEM / Platform Manufacturer | RSA-2048 or RSA-4096 | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | ML-DSA-87; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) where the key signs firmware or software | critical |
| KEK | OS Vendor / OEM | RSA-2048 | ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) | ML-DSA-87; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) where the key signs firmware or software | critical |
| db | OS Vendor / Software Publisher | RSA-2048 certificates | ML-DSA-65 X.509 certificates | ML-DSA-87 certificates; LMS or XMSS (SP 800-208) for firmware or software signatures | high |
| dbx | UEFI Forum / OEM / OS Vendor | Image digests and certificate revocation records | Preserve applicable revocation records | SHA-384 or SHA-512 (CNSA 2.0 hash algorithms) | low |
| MOK | Machine Owner / Admin | RSA-2048 or RSA-4096 | ML-DSA-65 (when shim supports FIPS 204) | ML-DSA-87 (when shim supports FIPS 204) | medium |
The db size impact is a key operational concern: a minimal self-signed ML-DSA-65 X.509 certificate is about 5.5 KB (5,538 bytes) against about 0.8 KB (809 bytes) for RSA-2048, measured with OpenSSL 3.6.3. Certificates with more fields are larger. Secure Boot variable storage is platform-specific; firmware reports it through QueryVariableInfo() (UEFI 2.11 section 8.2.4). A full PQC db migration may require platform NVRAM reallocation — verify UEFI NVRAM capacity before planning.
Vendor statements differ: see the Firmware Vendor Matrix (Intel Boot Guard, AMI, Insyde)
Image checks need firmware that supports the algorithm and db entries that use it; PK and KEK (update authorization) are migrated as a separate step. The UEFI Specification 2.10 Secure Boot section read here names no post-quantum signature type, so check the current specification and your firmware vendor.
GRUB2 PQC support planned. Shim: no release note up to 16.1 (13 August 2025) mentions post-quantum signatures; check the shim project for current status
ML-DSA kernel module signing is in mainline Linux from 7.0 (X.509 and PKCS#7); IMA/EVM ML-DSA signature verification from 7.2.
Dependent on kernel signing migration; follows OS kernel timeline
Related Resources
Products shown here are a representative selection — not an exhaustive list. For the full vendor landscape with PQC readiness status, visit the Tools & Products tab in this module or browse the Migrate catalog →
Analyze UEFI key hierarchies, migrate firmware signatures, and explore TPM attestation flows.
Check off all sections and mark this reading done.
Related modules
In the Industry Landscape
Check your understanding
15 questions on Secure Boot & Firmware PQC, each with its answer and the reason.
Take the quizNext step
Practice it: Firmware SigningFirmware Signing is the hands-on version of this module: the same ideas, run in your browser.
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification ChecklistFirmware Architects, Silicon Security Leads & Platform Security Engineers
Capabilities to require in your production tools:
- Immutable Boot ROM / OTP fuse root-of-trust verifying `LMS/HSS` (NIST SP 800-208), `XMSS`, or `ML-DSA-87` (CNSA 2.0) signatures before executing first-stage bootloaders.
- UEFI Secure Boot (`db`, `KEK`, `PK`) and Linux `IMA`/`kmod` signature verification supporting post-quantum X.509/PKCS#7 structures.
- Anti-rollback monotonic fuse/TPM counter enforcement preventing downgrade to classical-signed bootloader versions.
How to evaluate in your environment
Test boot verification of a validly signed PQC bootloader image and verify hard boot halt when 1 byte of the image or signature is modified or an older SVN is loaded.
Production evidence to collect
OTP root-key hash provisioning record, UART boot verification log, and negative tamper/rollback halt test receipt.
Completing this Hub module and its browser-based sample exercises teaches the technical and governance decision criteria for your role; it does not test, validate, or certify your deployed production systems.
Record evidence for your environment
Identify the tested build and configuration. Use reference IDs for observations. For a proposed exclusion, record the system boundary or rule and why it excludes this build.
Evidence missing. 0 of 3 requirements have a reference or scope rationale.
Learning module content can be inaccurate. Please double-check its information. Report inaccuracies in PQC Today GitHub Discussions.