Blockchain Cryptography
Master the cryptographic primitives of major blockchains and understand quantum threats.
Why this matters: Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana wallets sign with ECDSA/EdDSA today — a cryptographically-relevant quantum computer doesn't just threaten future transactions, it threatens every public key already exposed on-chain.
Start here: Choose Bitcoin on the chain selector and walk its nine steps: a secp256k1 key is generated inside the in-browser HSM, an address derived, then a transaction formatted, signed and verified.
For your role
- Executive / Business Leader
- Choose a blockchain and see the primitives it signs with, then the custody step's wallet tiers, HSM, MPC and PQC threats: every public key already on-chain is exposed, which is the risk to size before the migration proposals.
- Researcher / Academic
- Bitcoin's secp256k1, ECDSA and Keccak-256 and Solana's Ed25519 are explored hands-on, with the migration proposals and initiatives step tracking what each chain is considering.
- Curious Explorer
- Pick a blockchain and see the cryptography it actually uses; the module explains why a wallet's public key being visible on-chain is a problem once quantum computers exist.
What is Blockchain Cryptography?
Blockchains are fundamentally cryptographic systems. Every transaction is authorized by a , every address is derived from a public key through hash functions, and every wallet generates its keys from elliptic curve mathematics. There is no central authority — cryptography alone establishes ownership and prevents fraud.
- Private key controls funds (256-bit secret)
- Public key derived via elliptic curve math
- Digital signatures prove transaction authority
- SHA-256 secures Bitcoin blocks and addresses
- Keccak-256 derives Ethereum addresses
- RIPEMD-160 shortens Bitcoin address hashes
- Addresses are hashes of public keys
- Each chain uses a different derivation pipeline
- HD wallets generate unlimited addresses from one seed
Elliptic Curves: secp256k1 vs Ed25519
Blockchain private keys are random 256-bit numbers. The corresponding public key is derived via scalar multiplication on an — a one-way trapdoor function that is easy to compute forward but computationally infeasible to reverse. Two curves dominate:
Used by Bitcoin and Ethereum. Defined in SEC 2 (Certicom, 2010). 128-bit security level. Public keys are 33 bytes (compressed) or 65 bytes (uncompressed). Signatures use ; Bitcoin Taproot (P2TR) spends use Schnorr signatures (BIP-340) on the same curve.
Used by Solana. Defined in RFC 8032. Twisted Edwards curve with 128-bit security. 32-byte public keys. Signatures use , which derives each signature's nonce by hashing a secret part of the key together with the message, so signing needs no random number generator.
ECDSA needs a fresh, unique and unpredictable nonce k for every signature; reusing it or biasing it can reveal the private key. An implementation can draw k from a secure random source or derive it deterministically from the key and message (RFC 6979). Ed25519 EdDSA always derives its nonce deterministically from the key and message (RFC 8032), so a weak random number generator at signing time cannot repeat a nonce. Neither scheme is immune to implementation flaws: both still need defences against side-channel leaks.
Address Derivation Across Chains
The same mathematical operation (private key × generator point = public key) is just the first step. Each blockchain then applies a different hashing and encoding pipeline to derive the final address:
1...0x...Bitcoin uses a double-hash (SHA-256 then RIPEMD-160) to produce a 20-byte hash before encoding. Ethereum uses Keccak-256 (note: this is the original Keccak submission, not the NIST SHA3-256 standard — they differ in padding). Solana is the simplest: the 32-byte Ed25519 public key is directly Base58-encoded as the address.
Digital Signatures: ECDSA vs EdDSA
Digital signatures prove that a transaction was authorized by the holder of a private key without revealing the key itself. Each chain uses a different signature scheme with different trade-offs:
HD Wallets and Key Management
Rather than managing separate private keys for each address, derive an unlimited number of keys from a single seed. The standard converts random entropy into a 24-word mnemonic phrase for human-readable backup. defines the tree derivation, and standardizes the path structure across chains.
| Chain | Derivation Path | Standard | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bitcoin | m/44'/0'/0'/0/0 | BIP-32 / BIP-44 | Coin type 0, supports non-hardened child keys |
| Ethereum | m/44'/60'/0'/0/0 | BIP-32 / BIP-44 | Coin type 60, same derivation as Bitcoin |
| Solana | m/44'/501'/0'/0' | All segments hardened — Ed25519 does not support non-hardened derivation |
Post-Quantum Threats to Blockchains
Every cryptographic algorithm covered above — (ECDSA), (EdDSA), and the elliptic curves underlying HD wallets — is vulnerable to . Understanding these threats is essential before working with blockchain cryptography hands-on.
Why This Matters: Quantum Threats to Blockchain
Every cryptographic algorithm you used in this module — secp256k1 (ECDSA), Ed25519 (EdDSA), and the elliptic curves underlying HD wallets — is vulnerable to . A sufficiently powerful quantum computer () could derive private keys from public keys, breaking the security of all three blockchains.
| Chain | Algorithm | Quantum Threat | Migration Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bitcoin | secp256k1 ECDSA; Schnorr (BIP-340) for Taproot | Shor's algorithm breaks ECDLP, and with it both ECDSA and Schnorr signatures. A large share of early P2PK outputs sits in addresses with exposed public keys. | BIP-360 (P2MR) — Draft New output type via soft fork; no post-quantum signature yet |
| Ethereum | secp256k1 ECDSA + BLS12-381 | All accounts that have transacted expose public keys. Validator BLS signatures also vulnerable. | EIP-7702 + AA path — Active PQC signing available today via Account Abstraction; EF PQC team funded |
| Solana | Ed25519 EdDSA | Shor's algorithm breaks Ed25519. All account public keys are the address itself (always exposed). | SIMD community discussion No ratified proposal; structural migration challenge |
Risk for Blockchains
On-chain data is immutable — unlike traditional systems where you can rotate keys, blockchain transaction history is permanent. Public keys exposed in past transactions remain harvestable indefinitely. When cryptographically relevant quantum computers arrive, every previously exposed public key becomes a target. This makes the HNFL threat particularly severe for blockchains: there is no retroactive fix for exposed keys.
Source: Federal Reserve Board FEDS Paper, September 2025
Active PQC Protection Initiatives
The proposal introduces a new SegWit v2 output type (bc1z…) that works like Taproot with the quantum-vulnerable key-spend path removed. Requires a soft fork. It contains no post-quantum signature: its authors say they intend to offer a separate proposal for that upon further research.
Two complementary paths: EIP-4337 Account Abstraction (live) lets smart-contract wallets verify PQC signatures today. EIP-7702 (Pectra) allows EOAs to delegate to contract code, enabling PQC signing without a full migration. The Ethereum Foundation's Lean Ethereum roadmap proposes replacing validator BLS signatures with the hash-based leanXMSS scheme and using EIP-8141 account abstraction (considered for Hegotá in the second half of 2026) to give accounts signature agility, targeting core post-quantum infrastructure by approximately 2029. STARK-based and lattice-based commitments are the two leading candidates to replace KZG commitments.
SIMD-0461 (Solana Improvement Document), a proposed Falcon signature-verification syscall, was closed by its author on 2026-06-17. The core challenge is structural: Solana addresses are Ed25519 public keys — there is no hash layer to hide behind. Community proposals explore new PQC-keyed account types requiring users to explicitly migrate all assets and positions.
SIMD repositoryRelated Resources
Check off all sections and mark this reading done.
Related modules
- Automotive PQCSame track · Industries · Same migration phase · Shares Falcon, ML-DSA, ML-KEM
- Financial Services & Payments PQCSame track · Industries · Same migration phase · Shares Falcon, ML-DSA, ML-KEM
- Media, Entertainment & DRM PQCSame track · Industries · Same migration phase · Shares ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA
- Cryptographic APIs & Developer LanguagesShares Falcon, ML-DSA, ML-KEM
In the Industry Landscape
Check your understanding
20 questions on Digital Assets, each with its answer and the reason.
Take the quizNext step
Practice it: Bitcoin TransactionBitcoin Transaction is the hands-on version of this module: the same ideas, run in your browser.
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification ChecklistBlockchain Architects, Custody Engineers & Institutional Risk Leads
Capabilities to require in your production tools:
- Post-quantum signature verification (`ML-DSA`, `SLH-DSA`, `FN-DSA`, or hash-based schemes) in custody HSMs and account-abstraction / smart-contract wallets.
- Quantum-safe key derivation and seed backup replacing or augmenting classical BIP-32/BIP-39 secp256k1/Ed25519 key trees.
- Migration playbooks for exposed public-key outputs (P2PK / reused addresses) vulnerable to Shor-based private-key recovery.
How to evaluate in your environment
Simulate transaction signing, witness size overhead, and verification gas/compute cost using PQC signature schemes on a staging testnet.
Production evidence to collect
Testnet transaction receipt, serialized witness/signature byte-size profile, and custody HSM signing audit log.
Completing this Hub module and its browser-based sample exercises teaches the technical and governance decision criteria for your role; it does not test, validate, or certify your deployed production systems.
Record evidence for your environment
Identify the tested build and configuration. Use reference IDs for observations. For a proposed exclusion, record the system boundary or rule and why it excludes this build.
Evidence missing. 0 of 3 requirements have a reference or scope rationale.
Learning module content can be inaccurate. Please double-check its information. Report inaccuracies in PQC Today GitHub Discussions.