Back to DashboardIndustriesPhase 5 · Pilots & Migrationintermediate35 min

Custody Key Threats & Controls

Who can make a custody system sign, and which control combinations stop unauthorized signing today — blind vs clear signing, exfiltration paths, adversary models, case studies, and hybrid MPC + HSM architectures.

Why this matters: Keeping private keys inside an HSM, MPC cluster, or enclave does not prevent unauthorized transfers if an attacker can deceive the signing screen, hijack an authorized requester, or abuse pre-signed authorizations. Decisions depend on putting transaction parsing, policy checks, and quorum approvals inside a protected boundary with stated authority assumptions.

Start here: Open Blind vs Clear Signing, sign a sample transfer hash with CKM_ECDSA, then swap the hidden payload for a delegatecall upgrade to see why parsing without a policy check refuses nothing.

Practice in the Simulation

Educational scope & service-vs-asset boundary

This module uses fictional wallet scenarios and browser-simulated cryptographic runs to teach custody decision-making; completing these lessons or workshops does not verify or certify any deployed custody platform. In institutional custody, distinguish business services (such as a custody signing service or a long-lived records archiving and retrieval service) from protected assets (private keys, threshold shares, digital assets, and retained audit records themselves).

A custody design fails when teams treat where the private key sits as the entire security model. Holding a key inside an HSM or MPC cluster prevents direct raw-key export, but an attacker who controls signing authority — the ability to construct a payload, deceive the approval screen, reuse a pre-signed message, or trigger an API credential — can move funds without ever extracting the private key.

Foundational curve mechanics (secp256k1 vs Ed25519), deterministic ECDSA nonce derivation under RFC 6979, HD wallets, and the five-layer custody stack are taught in Digital Assets (LM-045) and are linked rather than repeated here. This module begins where key placement ends: who can make a custody system sign, and what stops unauthorized authority.

Nonce Integrity

ECDSA requires a fresh, random, uniformly chosen per-signature nonce k; RFC 6979 defines deterministic nonce generation so verifiers need no changes while avoiding RNG reuse failures.

Source: IETF RFC 6979 (Informational, August 2013), §1 Introduction (pp. 2–3)

Smart-Contract Quorum

In Safe.sol documentation, checkNSignatures verifies caller-supplied owner signatures over a transaction hash and warns callers to ensure executor is legitimate because an incorrect executor can reduce the required signature count by one.

Source: Safe{Wallet} Smart Account Docs, checkNSignatures -> Parameters -> executor

Smart-Contract Quorum

In Safe.sol contract source, checkSignatures enforces that the stored threshold is nonzero (reverting with GS001 otherwise) before passing that stored _threshold to checkNSignatures.

Source: Safe Smart Account Safe.sol Source, contracts/Safe.sol, checkSignatures

Delegated EOA Authority

EIP-7702 introduces an EIP-2718 transaction type that lets an Externally Owned Account (EOA) attach signed authorization tuples and write a persistent delegation indicator (0xef0100 || address) into its account code.

Source: Ethereum EIP-7702 (Pectra), Abstract & Specification

Rule G1 (Authority Assumptions)

Every claim in this module that a control “holds” explicitly states which signer, guardian, recovery, and contract-upgrade authorities an attacker must not hold for that guarantee to remain intact. Note how checkNSignatures depends on caller-supplied threshold and executor arguments unless gated by checkSignatures reading storage, and how EIP-7702 lets an EOA delegate execution persistently without exposing its private key.

Check off all sections and mark this reading done.

Check your understanding

55 questions on Custody Key Threats & Controls, each with its answer and the reason.

Take the quiz

Next step

Produce the artifact: Deployment Playbook

This module belongs to phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Deployment Playbook produces a deliverable of that phase in the Command Center.

Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Checklist

Capabilities to require in your production tools:

  • In-boundary transaction parsing, allowlist checks, and m-of-n quorum enforcement executed inside the HSM, enclave co-signer, or attested approver boundary rather than a host application.
  • Independent trusted-display clear signing (e.g., ERC-7730 descriptors paired with bounded ERC-8176 attestations) and bounded approval expiry/nonce binding preventing replay or silent delegatecall upgrades.
  • Explicit Rule G1 authority separation across signing shares, orchestrators, recovery quorums, and contract-upgrade admins (avoiding single-operator or host-RAM key unwrap exposure).

How to evaluate in your environment

Exercise staging custody policies against negative test cases: tampered amounts, expired approvals, replayed nonces, unallowlisted delegatecalls, and single-party threshold refusal.

Production evidence to collect

Signed custody policy ruleset, FIPS 140-3 CMVP module certificate & Excluded Components boundary review, and staging negative-test rejection logs.

Completing this Hub module and its browser-based sample exercises teaches the technical and governance decision criteria for your role; it does not test, validate, or certify your deployed production systems.

Record evidence for your environment

Identify the tested build and configuration. Use reference IDs for observations. For a proposed exclusion, record the system boundary or rule and why it excludes this build.

In-boundary transaction parsing, allowlist checks, and m-of-n quorum enforcement executed inside the HSM, enclave co-signer, or attested approver boundary rather than a host application.
Independent trusted-display clear signing (e.g., ERC-7730 descriptors paired with bounded ERC-8176 attestations) and bounded approval expiry/nonce binding preventing replay or silent delegatecall upgrades.
Explicit Rule G1 authority separation across signing shares, orchestrators, recovery quorums, and contract-upgrade admins (avoiding single-operator or host-RAM key unwrap exposure).

Evidence missing. 0 of 3 requirements have a reference or scope rationale.

Learning module content can be inaccurate. Please double-check its information. Report inaccuracies in PQC Today GitHub Discussions.