Back to DashboardSoftware InfrastructurePhase 5 · Pilots & Migrationintermediate50 min

Cloud-Native & SaaS PQC Migration

Plan and verify post-quantum migration across AWS, Azure, GCP, and SaaS: shared-responsibility boundaries, hybrid edge/origin TLS, cloud KMS/BYOK constraints, and vendor evidence scoping.

Why this matters: Cloud providers manage underlying hardware, but customers still control TLS policies, origin legs, KMS key specs, BYOK wrapping paths, and SaaS federation boundaries — misreading that split causes silent downgrades or false compliance claims.

Start here: Map a multi-cloud workload in the Cloud Estate Mapper to separate customer-controlled crypto surfaces from provider-managed layers and distinguish cloud services from protected assets.

Practice in the Simulation

Educational Scope & Production Verification

This module uses fictional multi-cloud workloads and sample configurations to teach how to evaluate cryptographic boundaries and plan PQC cutovers. Completing exercises here does not verify your deployed cloud accounts or SaaS tenants — apply the verification commands and evidence checks below using your own production tools.

1. Shared Responsibility & Protected Assets

Moving workloads to AWS, Azure, GCP, or SaaS does not hand post-quantum migration to the provider. Cloud shared responsibility splits cryptography across three layers: provider-managed infrastructure (physical HSMs, hypervisors, default service endpoints), shared configuration surfaces (CDN/load-balancer TLS policies, KMS key specs, regional endpoints), and customer-controlled choices (origin-leg TLS, client SDK group preferences, BYOK key-import ceremonies, and SaaS vendor governance).

Distinguish Business Services from Protected Assets

A cloud storage or records-archiving service is a business service; the long-lived encrypted records stored inside it are the protected asset. Prioritizing migration requires classifying the asset’s confidentiality horizon (for example, 10–30 years of exposure) and tracing every transport and key-wrapping surface that touches it.

What to Evaluate in Production Cloud Tooling

  • Cloud posture & IaC scanners: Can they flag classical-only TLS policies, legacy HSM tiers, and unapproved KMS key specs across all accounts?
  • Telemetry pipelines: Do load-balancer logs and CloudTrail record negotiated TLS NamedGroups rather than only protocol version?
  • Limitation: Passing a static IaC check does not prove live traffic negotiates hybrid key exchange — runtime handshake telemetry is required.

2. Edge, CDN & Origin TLS (RFC 9846 & RFC 10024)

TLS 1.3 (RFC 9846, which obsoleted RFC 8446 in July 2026) paired with PQ/T hybrid key agreement (RFC 10024, led by X25519MLKEM768, IANA NamedGroup 0x11EC) is the highest-leverage control against HNDL interception across cloud edges. Note that TLS hybrid groups are defined by RFC 10024 and negotiated via NamedGroup codepoints — not by .

Client-to-Edge Leg

CloudFront, AWS ALB, Google Cloud Load Balancing, and Azure Front Door terminate browser and API traffic at the edge. Enabling a hybrid TLS 1.3 policy protects only this outer hop.

Edge-to-Origin & Mesh

CDN-to-origin pools, API gateways, and cross-region service meshes (Envoy/Istio) are configured independently. An external scanner showing 0x11EC at the CDN does not verify the origin leg.

Middlebox ClientHello Size

An X25519MLKEM768 key share adds ~1,216 bytes (32-byte X25519 + 1,184-byte public key), pushing ClientHello across two TCP segments (~1,460-byte MSS). Legacy DPI proxies or WAFs can truncate or reset the handshake unless tested in canary rollouts.

3. Cloud KMS, BYOK & Storage Boundaries (Late 2026)

Object storage and managed databases encrypt data at rest with symmetric AES-256 keys (already quantum-resistant at 256-bit strength), while cloud KMS protects key-encryption keys (KEKs) and signing keys. Late-2026 provider capabilities vary significantly by key family, region, and import path — never generalize one cloud’s model to another:

AWS KMS & AWS CloudHSM

AWS KMS offers FIPS 204 signing keys (since June 2025) and FIPS 203 ML-KEM key-establishment keys (launched 26 October 2026 in commercial and GovCloud Regions; unavailable in China, Middle East UAE, and Middle East Bahrain Regions). Important boundaries: AWS KMS import wrapping is RSA-only (RSA_2048, RSA_3072, or RSA_4096, or SM2 in China Regions) and cannot import material into ML-DSA or ML-KEM keys; AWS KMS has no KMIP endpoint; Decapsulate returns the 32-byte ML-KEM shared secret in plaintext to the caller; and no KMS key policy condition can require post-quantum TLS (TLS group negotiation is a client setting verified via CloudTrail tlsDetails.keyExchange). AWS CloudHSM documents ML-DSA (FIPS mode on hsm2m.medium clusters from 1 September 2026) but documents no ML-KEM command.

Google Cloud KMS

Google Cloud KMS offers generally available ML-DSA and signing (July 2026). Its quantum-safe key import (in Preview for software-protected keys) wraps imported key material with HPKE (RFC 9180) using X-Wing, ML-KEM-768, or ML-KEM-1024; standard Cloud KMS key import uses RSA wrapping. Because Google’s July 2026 announcement and release notes differ on ML-KEM GA vs. Preview status, verify SLA and protection level in your target project and region.

Azure Key Vault / Managed HSM & FIPS 140-3 Cutover

Azure Key Vault and Managed HSM BYOK transfer keys wrapped with CKM_RSA_AES_KEY_WRAP under an RSA-HSM key exchange key (2048, 3072, or 4096 bits), with no documented KMIP endpoint. Across all three clouds, verify active FIPS 140-3 CMVP certificates: NIST moved FIPS 140-2 validations to Historical status in September 2026.

4. SaaS, Federation & Verifiable Evidence

In third-party SaaS and federated identity (OIDC/SAML), you cannot directly edit the vendor’s TLS stack or signing HSM. Your control shifts from configuration to evidence-based governance under frameworks such as (final October 2026) and US federal civilian mandates (EO 14412 and OMB M-26-15).

Core Governance Rule: Unknown Never Means Low Exposure

When a SaaS vendor leaves a PQC questionnaire blank, answers “roadmap TBD”, or cites only a marketing page, record that surface as Unverified / Evidence Gap— never as low risk. Pair vendor requests with independent external TLS probes, clear BYOK boundary definitions (primary DB vs. backups/logs), IdP token-size testing for future ML-DSA JWTs/SAML assertions, and subprocessor inheritance checks.

Ready to map a multi-cloud estate, verify provider commands, and test cutover failure modes?

Check off all sections and mark this reading done.

Next step

Produce the artifact: Deployment Playbook

This module belongs to phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Deployment Playbook produces a deliverable of that phase in the Command Center.

Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Checklist

Capabilities to require in your production tools:

  • Enforce hybrid PQ/T TLS 1.3 (RFC 10024, e.g., X25519MLKEM768) independently on both CDN/edge ingress and origin/east-west service legs, with downgrade monitoring.
  • Verify cloud KMS post-quantum key specs, ML-KEM/ML-DSA APIs, and BYOK wrapping boundaries across AWS KMS, Google Cloud KMS, and Azure Key Vault / Managed HSM.
  • Scope SaaS and identity-federation cryptographic boundaries (SAML/OIDC signing, webhook verification, tenant-managed encryption keys) and collect verifiable provider evidence.

How to evaluate in your environment

Capture TLS 1.3 ClientHello/ServerHello transcripts on both edge and origin legs, inspect cloud KMS key metadata and IAM policy logs in staging, and audit SaaS provider cryptographic documentation.

Production evidence to collect

Edge and origin TLS negotiation telemetry showing RFC 10024 hybrid groups, cloud KMS key-spec and BYOK import audit logs, and dated SaaS provider cryptographic boundary attestations.

Completing this Hub module and its browser-based sample exercises teaches the technical and governance decision criteria for your role; it does not test, validate, or certify your deployed production systems.

Record evidence for your environment

Identify the tested build and configuration. Use reference IDs for observations. For a proposed exclusion, record the system boundary or rule and why it excludes this build.

Enforce hybrid PQ/T TLS 1.3 (RFC 10024, e.g., X25519MLKEM768) independently on both CDN/edge ingress and origin/east-west service legs, with downgrade monitoring.
Verify cloud KMS post-quantum key specs, ML-KEM/ML-DSA APIs, and BYOK wrapping boundaries across AWS KMS, Google Cloud KMS, and Azure Key Vault / Managed HSM.
Scope SaaS and identity-federation cryptographic boundaries (SAML/OIDC signing, webhook verification, tenant-managed encryption keys) and collect verifiable provider evidence.

Evidence missing. 0 of 3 requirements have a reference or scope rationale.

Learning module content can be inaccurate. Please double-check its information. Report inaccuracies in PQC Today GitHub Discussions.