Protocol Simulations / 5G SUCI Construction
What you will do: Enter a 15-digit SUPI, pick Profile A (X25519), Profile B (P-256) or Profile C (ML-KEM, hybrid or pure), then execute eleven steps from home-network key generation to SUCI assembly and SIDF decryption.
Worked example: Default SUPI 310260123456789 under Profile A: X25519 ECDH, X9.63-KDF, AES-128 MSIN encryption and a MAC tag, then Decrypt SUCI at SIDF recovers the original SUPI.
Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.
For your role
- Developer / Engineer
- Execute the steps from Home Network Key Generation through the UE's SUCI construction with Execute Step: Profile A uses Curve25519 and AES-128, and the Operator view shows the exact values a network's de-concealment side would compute.
- Security Architect
- Switch between Operator view and IMSI-catcher view: the catcher sees only ephemeral ciphertext, never the SUPI, which is the property a PQC profile has to preserve when Curve25519 is replaced; Customize… changes the profile and identifiers.
- Researcher / Academic
- Run the 5G PQC Known Answer Tests panel and use Plain English beside each step to check the construction against the 3GPP profile; the live HSM mode runs the key agreement in softhsmv3.
An IMSI catcher within radio range sees every packet your phone broadcasts. SUCI conceals your identity so the catcher sees only ephemeral ciphertext — never your real IMSI.
Live HSM Mode Active
SoftHSM3 · PKCS#11 v3.2 · Rust · session open
1. Home Network Key Generation (Profile A)
The home network operator provisions a long-term asymmetric key pair. For Profile A, 5G mandates the use of Curve25519 (X25519), a state-of-the-art elliptic curve tailored for speed and security. The private key is securely stored for use by the SIDF (Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function) at the UDM for SUCI deconcealment, while the public key (32 bytes) is distributed to USIMs during SIM personalization.
// SoftHSMv3 WASM: Generate Home Network X25519 Key
const { pubHandle, privHandle } = hsm_generateECKeyPair(hsmd, sessionHandle, 'X25519'
, false, 'derive');
// Or inject Profile A explicit test vectors for KAT validation:
const hnPrivHandle = await hsm_injectTestKey(
hsmd, sessionHandle, hnPrivBytes, 'X25519'
);Execute a step to see live PKCS#11 operations.
Run the published Profile B sample: 3GPP TS 33.501 V19.7.0, Annex C.4.4.1, vector profile-b-imsi. Its fixed inputs use MCC|MNC 274012, MSIN 001002086 and plaintext block 00012080F6, independently of the wizard selection above. The five checks compare ECDH Z, the entire Enc key || ICB || MAC key output, ciphertext, MAC tag and scheme output. The final check chains operations on engine-derived keys; the other rows check individual published outputs. This does not check a full SUCI routing string, Profile A or research Profile C.
Official Profile B fixed-vector comparison
Published 3GPP TS 33.501 V19.7.0 Annex C.4.4.1 sample — all five required checks must pass
Click Run standard KATs to run 5 use-case scenarios. Evidence in this set: Published standard KAT — Expected values printed in a cited standard or consensus RFC.
Published 3GPP TS 33.501 V19.7.0 Annex C.4.4.1 sample — all five required checks must pass · Generated keys are for educational use only.
5G PQC Known Answer Tests
NIST FIPS 203/204 · NIST SP 800-227 (hybrid combiner) · 3GPP TS 33.501 Annex C.4
Predict a one-byte change
This fictional sample generates fresh ML-KEM-768 keys. Predict whether changing the selected byte should preserve verification or key confirmation, then run the actual operation.
Click Run known-answer checks to run 4 use-case scenarios. Evidence in this set: NIST ACVP-Server reference sample — Expected values copied from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository with immutable source identity; Functional round-trip — Output produced by an implementation is consumed by the same or paired implementation.
Reference samples from the public NIST ACVP-Server repository · NIST FIPS 203/204 · NIST SP 800-227 (hybrid combiner) · 3GPP TS 33.501 Annex C.4 · Generated keys are for educational use only.
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements
What this sample check establishes: Demonstrates 3GPP TS 33.501 5G SUPI-to-SUCI subscriber identity concealment and Home Network deconcealment using classical ECIES vs post-quantum KEM profiles.
Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Runs in browser memory; it does not test physical 5G USIM JavaCard applet constraints or radio-access RRC NAS signaling frames.
What to require and test in your production tools:
- SIDF and USIM support for operator-defined post-quantum SUCI protection schemes (TS 33.501 Annex C.1 allows up to 3,000 octets of scheme output; no standardized PQ profile exists in Rel-19).
- HSM-backed Home Network Private Key custody with automated key-identifier (`Home Network Public Key ID`) rotation.
- NAS registration payload budget verification for ~1.1 KB (`ML-KEM-768`) SUCI ciphertexts.
Try it
- 1. Predict before you run it.
- 2. Run or change the tool above.
- 3. Explain what the result shows.
Switch to the IMSI-catcher view during the SUCI steps. What does the catcher see?
Next step
Turn it into a plan: Hybrid Transition PlannerThis tool practises the 5G Security module, phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Hybrid Transition Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.
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