OpenSSL Studio / PKI Enrollment (EST + CMP)
What you will do: Generate an end-entity keypair, send a CMP Initial Request to an in-browser mock CA, run EST simpleenroll with the same key, then perform an ML-KEM-768 key update with encrCert proof of possession.
Worked example: Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair and press Send CMP Initial Request: the mock CA issues a certificate chain-validated against its root and shows it decoded; the KEM key update then reports whether both shared secrets match.
Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.
Browse all Crypto Lab tools · Learn with PKI Enrollment Protocols (EST & CMP)
For your role
- Developer / Engineer
- Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair, Send CMP Initial Request with a subject DN and shared secret, Run simpleenroll for EST, then Run ML-KEM-768 KUR: the four steps are the RFC 9810 and RFC 7030 exchanges a client library implements.
- Security Architect
- The CMP Initial Request is ML-DSA signed and the key update uses an encrypted-certificate proof of possession for a KEM key: these two steps show how enrollment works when the key cannot sign.
- Researcher / Academic
- Compare the CMP and EST enrollments of the same key and the KEM key update's encrCert proof of possession against RFC 9810 and RFC 7030; the full module adds composite enrollment and certificate inspection.
- IT Ops / DevOps
- Regenerate CA and run the four steps: the CMP and EST requests and the PKCS#7 response are what your enrollment endpoints will exchange with devices after the switch.
Step 1 — Generate end-entity key
Educational use only — generated keys never leave the browser and are not certified for production. Real CA enrollment requires a vetted HSM and audited issuance pipeline.
Step 2 — CMP Initial Request (ML-DSA signed)
Both ends of the CMP exchange run inside the OpenSSL 3.6 WASM build via the execute_cmp_simulation shim: real OSSL_CMP_CTX client + real OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX server, connected by OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_transfer_cb (no sockets, no file dance). The server's process_cert_request callback parses the CRMF template, builds an X509, and signs it with the mock CA's ML-DSA-65 key — actual issuance, not a pre-canned echo. The mock CA root is generated once in your browser and cached in IndexedDB.
Step 3 — EST simpleenroll (RFC 7030)
The browser verifies the PKCS#10 request signature before issuing a sample certificate through its local CA. It checks that the certificate contains the requested key, then builds the PKCS#7 response. This exercises the artifacts for /.well-known/est/simpleenroll. Real EST uses HTTPS and separate client authentication and authorization.
Generate the end-entity key in Step 1 first; simpleenroll builds the CSR from it.
Step 4 — CMP KEM Key Update (RFC 9810 / RFC 9883 encrCert POP)
The sample server encrypts a newly issued certificate to the fresh ML-KEM-768 key. The client must recover and validate it, then confirm its hash before the server completes the transaction. A separate fictional ML-DSA-65 signing identity authorizes renewal; its signature does not prove possession of the new ML-KEM private key.
Scenario setup provisions the signing identity and its trusted pin before the requester sends the key-update request. This local exercise runs both roles; in production, configure renewal authorization at the CA.
The starting enrollment is pre-authorized for this fictional identity. Its issuer and serial are checked separately from the new-key proof. This uses an opt-in modification of the bundled OpenSSL CMP server, rather than support in unmodified OpenSSL 3.6.3.
For your production tools, test authorization of the prior enrollment, encrypted-certificate recovery, certificate validation, transaction binding and explicit confirmation—including rejection cases. This fictional exchange does not validate a deployed CA or its policies.
Related standards and further reading
These references describe related formats and operations. A reference link does not establish conformance or show that this sample executes every protocol step.
| Layer | Standard | What it specifies |
|---|---|---|
| SPKI algorithm OID | RFC 9935 | ML-KEM-512/768/1024 OIDs in X.509 |
| SPKI key bytes (1184 B) | FIPS 203 | ML-KEM key generation + encap/decap |
| signatureAlgorithm OID | RFC 9881 | ML-DSA-44/65/87 OIDs in X.509 |
| signatureValue bytes (3309 B) | FIPS 204 | ML-DSA signing (CA side) |
| CMP protocol and certificate confirmation | RFC 9810 | Certificate Management Protocol (2025-07) |
| Downstream: same cert in S/MIME | RFC 9936 | ML-KEM in CMS (2026-03) |
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements
What this sample check establishes: Runs an in-process OpenSSL 3.6 WASM CMPv3 (`RFC 9810`) Initial Request (`ir`), EST (`RFC 7030`) `simpleenroll`, and `ML-KEM-768` encrypted-certificate key update (`kur` / `encrCert` POP).
Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Both client and mock CA run in the same browser WASM process with fictional credentials; it does not test production CA policy engines, RA approval queues, or network mTLS.
What to require and test in your production tools:
- Production CA support for CMPv3 (RFC 9810 / RFC 9483) `POPOPrivKey` `encrCert` proof-of-possession and strict `certConf` hash verification when issuing `ML-KEM` certificates.
- EST (RFC 7030) and ACME (RFC 8555) support for `ML-DSA` (RFC 9881 identifiers) PKCS#10 CSRs, with mutual TLS for EST and account-key JWS authentication for ACME.
- Negative enrollment testing confirming the CA rejects mismatched `certConf` hashes, invalid CSR signatures, and unauthorized renewal signers.
Try it
- 1. Predict before you run it.
- 2. Run or change the tool above.
- 3. Explain what the result shows.
Why does the ML-KEM key update use an encrypted-certificate proof of possession?
Next step
Turn it into a plan: Hybrid Transition PlannerThis tool practises the PKI Enrollment Protocols (EST & CMP) module, phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Hybrid Transition Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.
Related content
Next in OpenSSL Studio