OpenSSL Studio / PKI Enrollment (EST + CMP)

What you will do: Generate an end-entity keypair, send a CMP Initial Request to an in-browser mock CA, run EST simpleenroll with the same key, then perform an ML-KEM-768 key update with encrCert proof of possession.

Worked example: Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair and press Send CMP Initial Request: the mock CA issues a certificate chain-validated against its root and shows it decoded; the KEM key update then reports whether both shared secrets match.

Runtime and privacy: The cryptographic exercise runs in this browser. Review the site privacy terms before entering sensitive material; use synthetic inputs for learning and evaluation.

Browse all Crypto Lab tools · Learn with PKI Enrollment Protocols (EST & CMP)

For your role

Developer / Engineer
Generate an ML-DSA-65 keypair, Send CMP Initial Request with a subject DN and shared secret, Run simpleenroll for EST, then Run ML-KEM-768 KUR: the four steps are the RFC 9810 and RFC 7030 exchanges a client library implements.
Security Architect
The CMP Initial Request is ML-DSA signed and the key update uses an encrypted-certificate proof of possession for a KEM key: these two steps show how enrollment works when the key cannot sign.
Researcher / Academic
Compare the CMP and EST enrollments of the same key and the KEM key update's encrCert proof of possession against RFC 9810 and RFC 7030; the full module adds composite enrollment and certificate inspection.
IT Ops / DevOps
Regenerate CA and run the four steps: the CMP and EST requests and the PKCS#7 response are what your enrollment endpoints will exchange with devices after the switch.
Four-step PKI enrollment showcase — RFC 9810 (CMP, obsoletes RFC 4210) · RFC 9883 (CRMF KEM POP) · RFC 7030 (EST). Generate a key, enroll via CMP, enroll the same key via EST, then perform a quantum-safe KEM key update against an in-browser mock CA (for production, verify authorization, HSM key protection, and CA interoperability with your own PKI tools). Open the full module for composite enrollment and cert inspection steps.

Step 1 — Generate end-entity key

Algorithm:

Educational use only — generated keys never leave the browser and are not certified for production. Real CA enrollment requires a vetted HSM and audited issuance pipeline.

Step 2 — CMP Initial Request (ML-DSA signed)

Real in-process CMP IR

Both ends of the CMP exchange run inside the OpenSSL 3.6 WASM build via the execute_cmp_simulation shim: real OSSL_CMP_CTX client + real OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX server, connected by OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_transfer_cb (no sockets, no file dance). The server's process_cert_request callback parses the CRMF template, builds an X509, and signs it with the mock CA's ML-DSA-65 key — actual issuance, not a pre-canned echo. The mock CA root is generated once in your browser and cached in IndexedDB.

Provisioning CA…
Complete Step 1: Generate End-Entity Key first — CMP IR enrolls a key that must already exist.

Step 3 — EST simpleenroll (RFC 7030)

RFC 7030 simpleenroll — simulated

The browser verifies the PKCS#10 request signature before issuing a sample certificate through its local CA. It checks that the certificate contains the requested key, then builds the PKCS#7 response. This exercises the artifacts for /.well-known/est/simpleenroll. Real EST uses HTTPS and separate client authentication and authorization.

Generate an end-entity key in Step 1 first.

Generate the end-entity key in Step 1 first; simpleenroll builds the CSR from it.

Step 4 — CMP KEM Key Update (RFC 9810 / RFC 9883 encrCert POP)

ML-KEM certificate key update

The sample server encrypts a newly issued certificate to the fresh ML-KEM-768 key. The client must recover and validate it, then confirm its hash before the server completes the transaction. A separate fictional ML-DSA-65 signing identity authorizes renewal; its signature does not prove possession of the new ML-KEM private key.

Scenario setup provisions the signing identity and its trusted pin before the requester sends the key-update request. This local exercise runs both roles; in production, configure renewal authorization at the CA.

The starting enrollment is pre-authorized for this fictional identity. Its issuer and serial are checked separately from the new-key proof. This uses an opt-in modification of the bundled OpenSSL CMP server, rather than support in unmodified OpenSSL 3.6.3.

Sample prior-certificate authorization:

For your production tools, test authorization of the prior enrollment, encrypted-certificate recovery, certificate validation, transaction binding and explicit confirmation—including rejection cases. This fictional exchange does not validate a deployed CA or its policies.

Related standards and further reading

These references describe related formats and operations. A reference link does not establish conformance or show that this sample executes every protocol step.

LayerStandardWhat it specifies
SPKI algorithm OIDRFC 9935 ML-KEM-512/768/1024 OIDs in X.509
SPKI key bytes (1184 B)FIPS 203 ML-KEM key generation + encap/decap
signatureAlgorithm OIDRFC 9881 ML-DSA-44/65/87 OIDs in X.509
signatureValue bytes (3309 B)FIPS 204 ML-DSA signing (CA side)
CMP protocol and certificate confirmationRFC 9810 Certificate Management Protocol (2025-07)
Downstream: same cert in S/MIMERFC 9936 ML-KEM in CMS (2026-03)
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification Requirements

What this sample check establishes: Runs an in-process OpenSSL 3.6 WASM CMPv3 (`RFC 9810`) Initial Request (`ir`), EST (`RFC 7030`) `simpleenroll`, and `ML-KEM-768` encrypted-certificate key update (`kur` / `encrCert` POP).

Browser sandbox limitation (non-certification boundary): Both client and mock CA run in the same browser WASM process with fictional credentials; it does not test production CA policy engines, RA approval queues, or network mTLS.

What to require and test in your production tools:

  • Production CA support for CMPv3 (RFC 9810 / RFC 9483) `POPOPrivKey` `encrCert` proof-of-possession and strict `certConf` hash verification when issuing `ML-KEM` certificates.
  • EST (RFC 7030) and ACME (RFC 8555) support for `ML-DSA` (RFC 9881 identifiers) PKCS#10 CSRs, with mutual TLS for EST and account-key JWS authentication for ACME.
  • Negative enrollment testing confirming the CA rejects mismatched `certConf` hashes, invalid CSR signatures, and unauthorized renewal signers.

Try it

  1. 1. Predict before you run it.
  2. 2. Run or change the tool above.
  3. 3. Explain what the result shows.

Why does the ML-KEM key update use an encrypted-certificate proof of possession?

Next step

Turn it into a plan: Hybrid Transition Planner

This tool practises the PKI Enrollment Protocols (EST & CMP) module, phase 5 (Pilots & Migration); Hybrid Transition Planner produces a deliverable of that phase.