Decommissioning & Program Closure
Retire classical cryptography on a defensible schedule, prove the migration happened from observed behaviour, and hand the program to business-as-usual.
Why this matters: A migration isn't done when the ticket closes — it's done when the system's observed behavior proves it, and closing the program without that evidence just defers the risk instead of retiring it.
Start here: Explore one fictional asset in the Decommission Checklist: deprecate, mark removed, review the worksheet status and log. Then identify the independent observations needed to establish actual retirement with production tools.
For your role
- Executive / Business Leader
- Retire one classical asset through deprecate, remove, verify removed and close, plan which systems to verify with what proof per tier, and hand standing capabilities to permanent owners: done means proven, not ticketed.
- GRC / Risk & Compliance
- The Verification Coverage Planner sets the proof per tier, and the Closure & Handover Register records the transfer of standing capabilities: the closure evidence the Migration Verification tool collects.
- IT Ops / DevOps
- The Decommission Checklist is the runbook for retiring a classical asset; the coverage planner says which systems need observed-behaviour proof and which a lighter check.
Retire classical crypto safely
● standardThe migration isn't done when PQC is added — it's done when the classical cryptography is gone. The defensible schedule is the deprecation timeline: NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026) deprecates quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography (RSA, ECC, finite-field DH) at 112-bit security and up after 2030 and disallows it under NIST standards after 2035; NCSC-UK sets phased targets — 2028 (discovery + plan), 2031 (highest-priority migration), 2035 (complete); NIST SP 800-131A carries the transition rules. Keep regulatory scopes distinct when setting retirement dates: CNSA 2.0 FAQ v2.2 binds U.S. National Security Systems (acquisitions 1 Jan 2027, phase-out 31 Dec 2030, mandated 31 Dec 2031); EO 14412 & OMB M-26-15 bind U.S. federal civilian HVAs/high-impact systems (key establishment 2030, signatures 2031) and direct a proposed FAR contractor rule; EU PQC Roadmap v1.1 coordinates Member State timelines alongside DORA/NIS2 cyber risk-management duties.
The discipline is four steps: deprecate → remove → verify removed → log. The step teams skip is the third — confirm by observation that the old key material is gone, not just that a new key exists.
Prove it from observed behaviour
◆ practitionerA system is “migrated” when its behaviour shows it — the handshake negotiates ML-KEM/ML-DSA — not when a change ticket says so. Reuse the Active PQC Scanner (in the PQC Testing module) and passive handshake capture to collect the evidence. (Evidence-by-observed-behaviour is practitioner guidance.)
● standardThe control basis is independent: NIST CSWP 48 (draft) maps the NCCoE Migration-to-PQC capabilities to CSF 2.0 and SP 800-53. When verifying vendor-supplied cryptographic modules, distinguish ACVP algorithm conformance (mathematical test vectors) from active CMVP FIPS 140-3 module validation (certificate status, module version, and Security Policy operational environment). A vendor marketing claim or a Hub sample export is never verification evidence.
Coverage at estate scale
◆ practitionerYou can't verify a large estate by hand, so decide which systems and what proof per tier: verify business-critical systems fully, sample the rest per migration wave, and let any sampled failure widen the check. (The specific sampling rule is practitioner guidance, not a named standard.)
Close into business-as-usual
◆ practitionerPrograms drift into an unfunded twilight unless they close deliberately. Define closure criteria in advance, accept residual risk with a named owner + re-evaluation date, and hand the standing capabilities — CBOM, continuous discovery, vendor cadence, SOC content, KRIs, crypto-agility — to permanent owners, with an archived evidence dossier.
● standardAnchor the generic governance to ISO/IEC 27001 and the NIST Risk Management Framework (SP 800-37) residual-risk-acceptance process. Make “acquire only PQC-capable products” a standing procurement rule — the CISA product-category list (2026) flags the categories where they are already available.
Related modules
Check your understanding
15 questions on Decommissioning & Program Closure, each with its answer and the reason.
Take the quizNext step
Produce the artifact: Migration Verification & ClosureThis module belongs to the Verification & Closure phase; Migration Verification & Closure produces a deliverable of that phase in the Command Center.
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification ChecklistInternal Auditors, QA Leads, CISOs & Release Approvers
Capabilities to require in your production tools:
- Five-point technical migration verification per system: (1) observed PQC negotiation on the wire, (2) negative tamper/downgrade rejection test, (3) end-to-end PQC certificate-chain validation, (4) documented fallback policy, and (5) archived verification dossier.
- Distinction between recorded reference notes and independently executed technical verification tests.
- Continuous post-cutover regression monitoring preventing silent configuration drift back to classical-only cryptography.
How to evaluate in your environment
Audit migration closure dossiers by re-running the linked packet-capture check, negative tamper test, and `openssl verify` command against the live staging/production endpoint.
Production evidence to collect
Complete 5-point verification dossier containing pcap hashes, negative-test failure logs, cert-chain validation output, and reviewer sign-off.
Completing this Hub module and its browser-based sample exercises teaches the technical and governance decision criteria for your role; it does not test, validate, or certify your deployed production systems.
Record evidence for your environment
Identify the tested build and configuration. Use reference IDs for observations. For a proposed exclusion, record the system boundary or rule and why it excludes this build.
Evidence missing. 0 of 3 requirements have a reference or scope rationale.
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