Talking About PQC Accurately
What is true today, which dates are real, what a certificate proves, and which words to avoid — for anyone who has to talk about post-quantum cryptography at work.
Why this matters: Customers, buyers and journalists can now check a quantum claim against public records. A sentence that overstates a deadline or a certificate costs more trust than it ever wins.
Start here: Pick the most accurate version of each claim in the Claim Checker: six sentences you will hear in pitches and press releases, each with the reason one version holds up and the others do not.
The one-minute version
Most online security — the padlock in a browser, signed software updates, bank transfers — relies on mathematics that a large enough quantum computer could undo. No such computer exists yet. But data copied today could be read once one does, which is why people call the risk “harvest now, decrypt later”.
The replacements already exist. NIST published three post-quantum standards in August 2024: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for setting up secure connections, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for digital signatures. The slow part now is fitting them into every product and system.
That is the whole story in three sentences: a real risk, a published fix, and years of work to apply it.
Dates that are real — and whose they are
Every real date belongs to someone and applies to specific systems. Before you quote a date, say whose it is and what it covers.
| What | Applies to | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Replacement algorithms published (FIPS 203, 204, 205) — August 2024 | NIST, for everyone | Final standards |
| Post-quantum key establishment by end of 2030; signatures by end of 2031 | US federal civilian high-value and high-impact systems, and their contractors (EO 14412) | In force |
| Software signing and traditional networking use only CNSA 2.0 algorithms by 2030; all systems by 2035 | US national security systems (NSA CNSA 2.0) | In force |
| Deprecate the weakest quantum-vulnerable algorithms after 2030; disallow all of them after 2035 | Systems that follow NIST rules (NIST IR 8547) | Draft proposal |
| A quantum computer able to break today’s encryption | Nobody | Estimate — experts disagree |
A private company outside these scopes may have no legal deadline at all — but its customers may. Other countries set their own schedules; the Timeline lists them with their sources.
What a certificate proves
“Certified” is the word most often stretched. In the US and Canada, the FIPS 140-3 programme has three stages that are easy to confuse:
- Algorithm tested (CAVP certificate). One implementation of one algorithm passed its tests. It says nothing about the rest of the product.
- In process. The module appears on NIST’s Modules In Process list: validation has started, not finished.
- Validated (FIPS 140-3 certificate). The module passed. The certificate has a number anyone can look up, and it covers a specific version and configuration.
Other schemes — Common Criteria and the EU’s EUCC, for example — work differently, but the same rule applies: read what a certificate covers before you read its level. Post-quantum algorithms added in a later version are not covered by an older certificate.
This site’s product catalogue shows these same three stages, taken from the public records, for every product it lists.
Words to check before you use them
| Phrase | The problem | Say instead |
|---|---|---|
| “Quantum-proof”, “unbreakable” | No cryptography is proven unbreakable, and standards bodies do not use these words. | “Uses ML-KEM (FIPS 203), NIST’s post-quantum standard, from version 5.2.” |
| “Quantum-safe”, “quantum-resistant” | Widely used — ETSI’s standards use “quantum-safe”, NIST uses “quantum-resistant”. Both mean designed to resist known quantum attacks, not guaranteed. | Fine, as long as you say what is inside and from which version. |
| “NIST-approved product”, “NIST-certified” | NIST standardizes algorithms. It does not approve or certify products. | “Implements ML-DSA (FIPS 204); FIPS 140-3 certificate #…” |
| “FIPS certified” | Which stage? Algorithm tested, in process, or validated are three different things. | Name the stage and give the certificate number or the list it appears on. |
| “PQC-ready” | There is no agreed definition. | Say which parts of the product, which algorithms, and from which version. |
| “CNSA 2.0 compliant” | CNSA 2.0 names specific algorithms and sizes, and applies to US national security systems. | Name the CNSA 2.0 algorithms the product supports, if it does. |
Answering “are you quantum-safe?”
A useful answer has three parts, each with something the listener can check:
- What is protected today — which parts of the product, with which algorithms, from which version.
- What is planned, and when — a public roadmap is stronger than a promise in a meeting.
- The evidence — certificate numbers, a roadmap page, or a cryptography bill of materials (a list of the cryptography a product uses).
If part of the answer is “we don’t know yet”, say so. Customers comparing suppliers notice a confident answer that cannot be checked.
This site lists every product on the same terms, whoever makes it, and links each claim to its source. It is evidence you can point to — not a ranking.
Related modules
- Architect Quantum ImpactSame track · Role Guides · Same migration phase · Shares NSA CNSA 2.0, NIST IR 8547
- Executive Quantum ImpactSame track · Role Guides · Shares NSA CNSA 2.0, NIST IR 8547
- PQC GRCSame migration phase · Shares NSA CNSA 2.0, NIST IR 8547
- Quantum ThreatsSame migration phase · Shares NSA CNSA 2.0, NIST IR 8547
Next step
Check a claim: who has actually shippedThe Migrate catalogue shows each product’s post-quantum support and certificate stage, taken from public records — the evidence this module tells you to point to.
Learning module content can be inaccurate. Please double-check its information. Report inaccuracies in PQC Today GitHub Discussions.