Back to DashboardSoftware InfrastructurePhase 6 · Infrastructure & Performanceadvanced60 min

Secrets Management & PQC

Master PQC migration for secrets managers: classify secrets by risk, simulate Vault transit with ML-KEM, design rotation policies, and integrate into CI/CD pipelines.

Why this matters: A secret stored in Vault today with a 5-year rotation policy needs a PQC migration plan now, not when the rotation comes due — harvest-now-decrypt-later risk doesn't wait for your rotation schedule.

Start here: Design a PQC-aware rotation policy in step 3: each secret type gets a recommended TTL based on its risk level and HNDL exposure.

For your role

Developer / Engineer
Classify secret types by HNDL exposure, simulate Vault transit operations with PQC algorithms, and integrate PQC-safe secrets into Kubernetes, GitHub Actions and Terraform in the Pipeline Integration Lab.
Security Architect
The Rotation Policy Designer with automated TTL recommendations and the cloud provider comparison across AWS, Azure, GCP and Vault are the design decisions; a five-year rotation policy needs a plan now.
Researcher / Academic
The provider comparison records current PQC readiness of the secrets managers, and the Vault transit simulator shows the operations with PQC algorithms.
IT Ops / DevOps
The rotation policy designer and the pipeline integration steps are the operational changes; the classification step says which secrets go first.
Practice in the Simulation

Organizations manage two distinct categories of sensitive material: secrets (API keys, credentials, tokens, seed phrases) and cryptographic keys (KEKs, signing keys, DEKs). Understanding the distinction matters for PQC migration because they have different protection mechanisms and different risk profiles.

Secrets themselves are often not directly encrypted with asymmetric cryptography — they are stored in vaults that use envelope encryption. In envelope encryption, a Data Encryption Key (DEK) encrypts the secret, and a Key Encryption Key (KEK) wraps the DEK. The KEK is the quantum-vulnerable component when it uses RSA-OAEP or ECDH-ES. Migrating to for the KEK protects all secrets in the vault without touching the secrets themselves.

Secret TypeClassical ProtectionPQC ProtectionPriority
API Keys / TokensAES-256 DEK wrapped with RSA-OAEP KEKML-KEM-768 KEK → AES-256 DEKHigh
DB CredentialsVault master key (RSA unsealed)ML-KEM vault seal + dynamic secrets TTL 8hCritical
TLS Private KeysPKCS#12 encrypted with 3DES/AESML-DSA key pair + HSM storageCritical
Signing KeysRSA-2048 / ECDSA P-256ML-DSA-65 or ML-DSA-87Critical
OAuth JWT SigningRS256 (RSA-2048)ML-DSA-65 JWK (JOSE PQC draft)High
AES-256-GCM DEKsAES-256-GCM (direct)AES-256-GCM (unchanged, already safe)Low

Key insight: The problem — how do you securely introduce an application to the vault without hardcoding a first credential? — is addressed by SPIFFE/SPIRE injecting verified workload identity. For the vault itself, migrating the master seal key to ML-KEM cascades PQC protection to all stored secrets.

Related Resources

Products shown here are a representative selection — not an exhaustive list. For the full vendor landscape with PQC readiness status, visit the Tools & Products tab in this module or browse the Migrate catalog →

Classify secrets by risk, simulate Vault transit PQC, design rotation policies, and compare cloud providers.

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Next step

Produce the artifact: Infrastructure Modernization Planner

This module belongs to phase 6 (Infrastructure & Performance); Infrastructure Modernization Planner produces a deliverable of that phase in the Command Center.

Learning module content can be inaccurate. Please double-check its information. Report inaccuracies in PQC Today GitHub Discussions.