Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
Understand fully homomorphic encryption before choosing the optional advanced path for HSM custody, controlled decryption and assurance evidence.
Why this matters: FHE can keep inputs and results encrypted while an evaluator computes, but it does not by itself provide result integrity, hide every form of metadata, or make decryption authorization safe. Scheme choice, parameters and key custody determine whether the design meets its real threat model.
Start here: Start with the noise budget: apply additions and multiplications, watch CKKS levels and TFHE noise change, and explain when bootstrapping is required.
For your role
- Executive / Business Leader
- Use the FHE foundations path to separate the business promise from the limits: FHE can reduce evaluator trust, but cost, metadata leakage, result integrity and key-custody decisions remain.
- GRC / Risk & Compliance
- Use the FHE foundations path to test vendor claims against the actual boundary: FHE is not anonymisation, result integrity, FIPS validation or proof that a computation was correct.
- Developer / Engineer
- Start with scheme choice, noise and circuit shape, then use the optional advanced path to trace the calls made by the owner, evaluator and custodian.
- Security Architect
- Use the foundations path to choose the scheme and parameter envelope; the advanced path then maps secrets, public evaluation keys, ciphertexts and controlled decryption across trust zones.
- Researcher / Academic
- Compare the four ISO/IEC 28033 draft scheme families and the measured implementation evidence, then use the advanced path for decryption-oracle, flooding and threshold limitations.
- IT Ops / DevOps
- Start with the operational cost and failure boundary, then use the advanced path for controlled decryption, audit, rate limits, rotation, backup and recovery.
- Curious Explorer
- Follow the foundations path for the central idea: a server can calculate on encrypted data, but it pays a large performance cost and still reveals some metadata. The HSM custody material is intentionally left out of this path.
Choose your learning path
For: Anyone evaluating, designing, implementing or operating an FHE workload. This path completes on 8 Learn sections and 1 workshop step. Shared content counts toward every path; optional references are never required.
- FHE lets a server compute on data it only ever sees encrypted: the trust moves from hardware to mathematics.
- “Fully” means any computation can in principle be evaluated, not that every computation is exact, fast or verified.
A TEE protects data in use by trusting hardware. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) takes the other route: it trusts mathematics. The server computes directly on ciphertexts and returns an encrypted result. It never sees the input or the output, and there is no enclave to attest. The cost is speed: FHE is orders of magnitude slower than computing in the clear.
| TEE | FHE | |
|---|---|---|
| Root of trust | CPU vendor, firmware, attestation chain | Hardness of lattice problems |
| Data inside the server | Plaintext, inside the enclave | Always ciphertext |
| Side channels | Main attack surface | Plaintext is absent, but timing, traffic, access patterns, circuit shape, dimensions and implementation leakage remain |
| Speed | Near native | 10³–10⁶× slower; needs GPU/FPGA at scale |
| Integrity of the result | Attested code | Not provided — ciphertexts are malleable |
| Quantum status | Attestation signatures are classical today | Core scheme is lattice-based |
Threat model before scheme choice
FHE primarily hides plaintext from the evaluator. It does not automatically prove that the evaluator ran the right circuit, authenticate ciphertexts, hide request timing or size, conceal every access pattern, protect a compromised client, or authorize who may receive a decrypted result. Record the evaluator, client, custodian and result recipient separately, then state which may be malicious or collude.
If correctness against a malicious evaluator matters, add an integrity mechanism such as a verifiable-computation proof or an application-specific check. Circuit privacy and model privacy are separate requirements from input confidentiality.
What “fully homomorphic” promises, and what it does not
Gentry proposed a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, “a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt” (Gentry, STOC 2009). “Fully” means there is no limit on which circuit can be evaluated: with bootstrapping, additions and multiplications can be chained without end. It is a statement about what is possible, not about precision, speed, integrity or who sees the result. The name invites expectations that the sources qualify:
| The name invites | What the sources show |
|---|---|
| Any computation can run on encrypted data | In principle yes, but each scheme favours a data type. Microsoft SEAL: “For applications where exact values are necessary, the BFV and BGV schemes are more suitable”, CKKS suits real numbers, and with these schemes “encrypted comparison, sorting, or regular expressions, are in most cases not feasible”. TFHE handles comparisons and lookup logic, on small integers. |
| Results come back exact | Depends on the scheme. CKKS is “a homomorphic encryption scheme for approximate arithmetic” (Cheon, Kim, Kim & Song 2017): results are close to the true value, correct to a number of bits. BFV, BGV and TFHE return exact integers as long as the noise stays within bounds. |
| The data is protected | Whoever holds the secret key, or may ask for decryptions, decides who sees results (section 8). |
| It runs at a usable speed | At a cost. The ICO describes HE as “several thousand times slower than processing plaintext”; DARPA estimated in 2021 that it was “about a million times slower” to compute in the FHE world; NIST SP 800-226 says that in most cases secure computation “is several orders of magnitude slower than native execution” and that “its performance is improving quickly” (section 4) (not sourced in the Library). |
| Decrypted results can be shared freely | Not without care. Decrypted CKKS results seen by others can lead to key recovery (Li & Micciancio 2021); the countermeasure, noise flooding, costs precision (Li, Micciancio, Schultz & Sorrell 2022). Exact schemes need a negligible decryption-failure probability (Cheon et al. 2024). |
References
Definitions, schemes and data types
- Gentry. Fully Homomorphic Encryption Using Ideal Lattices. STOC 2009, pp. 169–178. dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1536414.1536440
- Cheon, Kim, Kim, Song. Homomorphic Encryption for Arithmetic of Approximate Numbers. ASIACRYPT 2017, IACR ePrint 2016/421. eprint.iacr.org/2016/421 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2016-421
- Lattigo v6 package documentation (CKKS: fixed-point approximate arithmetic). pkg.go.dev/github.com/tuneinsight/lattigo/v6
- Microsoft SEAL, README (choosing between BFV/BGV and CKKS). github.com/microsoft/SEAL
- Zama, Concrete ML documentation, “Key concepts” (16-bit integer limit). docs.zama.org/concrete-ml/get-started/concepts
Decryption limits
- Li, Micciancio. On the Security of Homomorphic Encryption on Approximate Numbers. EUROCRYPT 2021, IACR ePrint 2020/1533. eprint.iacr.org/2020/1533 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2020-1533
- Li, Micciancio, Schultz, Sorrell. Securing Approximate Homomorphic Encryption Using Differential Privacy. CRYPTO 2022, IACR ePrint 2022/816. eprint.iacr.org/2022/816 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2022-816
- Bossuat, Costache, Mouchet, Nürnberger, Troncoso-Pastoriza. Accurate and Composable Noise Estimates for CKKS with Application to Exact HE Computation. IACR Communications in Cryptology 2025, IACR ePrint 2024/853. eprint.iacr.org/2024/853 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2024-853
- Checri, Sirdey, Boudguiga, Bultel. On the practical CPAD security of “exact” and threshold FHE schemes and libraries. CRYPTO 2024, IACR ePrint 2024/116. eprint.iacr.org/2024/116 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2024-116
- Cheon, Choe, Passelègue, Stehlé, Suvanto. Attacks Against the INDCPA-D Security of Exact FHE Schemes. ACM CCS 2024, IACR ePrint 2024/127. eprint.iacr.org/2024/127 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2024-127
- Loftus, May, Smart, Vercauteren. On CCA-Secure Fully Homomorphic Encryption. IACR ePrint 2010/560. eprint.iacr.org/2010/560 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2010-560
- Chenal, Tang. On Key Recovery Attacks against Existing Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes. LATINCRYPT 2014, IACR ePrint 2014/535. eprint.iacr.org/2014/535 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2014-535
- Manulis, Nguyen. Fully Homomorphic Encryption beyond IND-CCA1 Security: Integrity through Verifiability. EUROCRYPT 2024, IACR ePrint 2024/202. eprint.iacr.org/2024/202 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2024-202
- Bootland et al. (Zama). Threshold (Fully) Homomorphic Encryption. IACR ePrint 2025/699 (preprint). eprint.iacr.org/2025/699 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2025-699
- Colin de Verdière, Passelègue, Stehlé. On Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption with Synchronized Decryptors. IACR ePrint 2026/031 (preprint). eprint.iacr.org/2026/031
- Zama fhEVM documentation (zero-knowledge proofs on inputs; threshold key management); NIST Threshold Call preview TCall-1 Zama-PW01.
- OpenFHE documentation, “Making CKKS More Secure” (NOISE_FLOODING_DECRYPT).
- TFHE-rs documentation, “Security and cryptography” (noise, failure probability and IND-CPA-D). docs.zama.org/tfhe-rs/get-started/security-and-cryptography
- Lattigo, SECURITY.md (IND-CPA-D security, DecodePublic). github.com/tuneinsight/lattigo/blob/main/SECURITY.md
- OpenFHE, CKKS_NOISE_FLOODING.md (noise flooding and static noise estimation). github.com/openfheorg/openfhe-development/blob/main/src/pke/examples/CKKS_NOISE_FLOODING.md
- OpenFHE, ckks-noise-flooding.cpp example (experimental NOISE_FLOODING_DECRYPT mode). github.com/openfheorg/openfhe-development/blob/main/src/pke/examples/ckks-noise-flooding.cpp
Use cases
- Apple Machine Learning Research. Combining Machine Learning and Homomorphic Encryption in the Apple Ecosystem. October 2024. machinelearning.apple.com/research/homomorphic-encryption
- Lauter, Kannepalli, Laine, Cruz Moreno. Password Monitor: Safeguarding passwords in Microsoft Edge. Microsoft Research Blog, 21 January 2021. www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/password-monitor-safeguarding-passwords-in-microsoft-edge/
- Chen, Laine, Rindal. Fast Private Set Intersection from Homomorphic Encryption. ACM CCS 2017, IACR ePrint 2017/299. eprint.iacr.org/2017/299
- Blatt, Gusev, Polyakov, Goldwasser. Secure large-scale genome-wide association studies using homomorphic encryption. PNAS 117(21), 2020. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7261120/
- Engelsma, Jain, Boddeti. HERS: Homomorphically Encrypted Representation Search. IEEE T-BIOM 2021, arXiv 2003.12197. arxiv.org/abs/2003.12197
- Gilad-Bachrach, Dowlin, Laine, Lauter, Naehrig, Wernsing. CryptoNets. ICML 2016. proceedings.mlr.press/v48/gilad-bachrach16.html
- Han et al. Logistic Regression on Homomorphic Encrypted Data at Scale. AAAI 2019. ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/5000
- IMDA (Singapore) PET Sandbox, case study: Mastercard. www.imda.gov.sg/-/media/imda/files/programme/pet-sandbox/imda-pet-sandbox--case-study--mastercard.pdf
- Anastasia, Ho. Stepping through the looking glass of privacy-enhancing technologies. Mastercard, 1 April 2024. www.mastercard.com/news/perspectives/2024/stepping-through-the-looking-glass-of-privacy-enhancing-technologies/
- United Nations. Guide on Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for Official Statistics. 2023 (Statistics Korea, case study 11). unstats.un.org/bigdata/task-teams/privacy/guide/2023_UN%20PET%20Guide.pdf
- Zama Protocol litepaper (vendor documentation). docs.zama.org/protocol/zama-protocol-litepaper
- Masters et al. (IBM and Banco Bradesco). Real World Crypto 2020, IACR ePrint 2019/1113. eprint.iacr.org/2019/1113
Overhead and acceleration
- UK Information Commissioner’s Office. Privacy-enhancing technologies: homomorphic encryption. ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/data-sharing/privacy-enhancing-technologies/what-pets-are-there/homomorphic-encryption-he/
- DARPA. DARPA Selects Researchers to Accelerate Use of Fully Homomorphic Encryption. 8 March 2021. www.darpa.mil/news-events/2021-03-08
- DARPA. Data Protection in Virtual Environments (DPRIVE) programme page. www.darpa.mil/research/programs/data-protection-in-virtual-environments
- NIST SP 800-226, Guidelines for Evaluating Differential Privacy Guarantees. March 2025. nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-226.pdf
- Gentry, Halevi. Implementing Gentry’s Fully-Homomorphic Encryption Scheme. EUROCRYPT 2011, IACR ePrint 2010/520. eprint.iacr.org/2010/520
- Jung et al. Over 100x Faster Bootstrapping in Fully Homomorphic Encryption through Memory-centric Optimization with GPUs. TCHES 2021. tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/9062
- Agrawal et al. FAB: An FPGA-based Accelerator for Bootstrappable Fully Homomorphic Encryption. HPCA 2023, arXiv 2207.11872. arxiv.org/abs/2207.11872
- Riazi, Laine, Pelton, Dai. HEAX: An Architecture for Computing on Encrypted Data. ASPLOS 2020, arXiv 1909.09731. arxiv.org/abs/1909.09731
- Samardzic et al. F1: A Fast and Programmable Accelerator for Fully Homomorphic Encryption. MICRO 2021, arXiv 2109.05371. arxiv.org/abs/2109.05371
- Samardzic et al. CraterLake: A Hardware Accelerator for Efficient Unbounded Computation on Encrypted Data. ISCA 2022. people.csail.mit.edu/sanchez/papers/2022.craterlake.isca.pdf
- Kim et al. BTS: An Accelerator for Bootstrappable Fully Homomorphic Encryption. ISCA 2022, arXiv 2112.15479. arxiv.org/abs/2112.15479
- Kim et al. ARK: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Accelerator with Runtime Data Generation and Inter-Operation Key Reuse. MICRO 2022, arXiv 2205.00922. arxiv.org/abs/2205.00922
- Moore. IEEE Spectrum article on Intel’s Heracles FHE chip, 10 March 2026. spectrum.ieee.org/fhe-intel
- Chillotti, Gama, Georgieva, Izabachène. TFHE: Fast Fully Homomorphic Encryption over the Torus. Journal of Cryptology 2020, IACR ePrint 2018/421. eprint.iacr.org/2018/421 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2018-421
- Cheon, Han, Kim, Kim, Song. A Full RNS Variant of Approximate Homomorphic Encryption. SAC 2018, IACR ePrint 2018/931. eprint.iacr.org/2018/931
- Bossuat, Mouchet, Troncoso-Pastoriza, Hubaux. Efficient Bootstrapping for Approximate Homomorphic Encryption with Non-Sparse Keys. EUROCRYPT 2021, IACR ePrint 2020/1203. eprint.iacr.org/2020/1203 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2020-1203
- Bossuat, Troncoso-Pastoriza, Hubaux. Bootstrapping for Approximate Homomorphic Encryption with Negligible Failure-Probability by Using Sparse-Secret Encapsulation. IACR ePrint 2022/024 (source of the N16QP1546H192H32 parameter set used in the workshop’s CKKS measurements). eprint.iacr.org/2022/024 · Library: IACR-ePrint-2022-024
- Bae, Cheon, Cho, Kim, Kim. META-BTS: Bootstrapping Precision Beyond the Limit. ACM CCS 2022, IACR ePrint 2022/1167 (the higher-precision bootstrapping behind the workshop’s second CKKS parameter set). eprint.iacr.org/2022/1167
Standards and compliance
- ISO/IEC 28033-1 to -4, Information security — Fully homomorphic encryption (project pages). www.iso.org/standard/87640.html
- ISO/IEC 18033-6:2019, Encryption algorithms — Part 6: Homomorphic encryption. www.iso.org/standard/67740.html
- HomomorphicEncryption.org. Homomorphic Encryption Security Standard v1.1. 21 November 2018. homomorphicencryption.org/standard/
- NIST SP 800-140C r2, CMVP Approved Security Functions. nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-140Cr2.pdf
- NIST CMVP, Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-3 (IG 2.4.A). csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/fips%20140-3/FIPS%20140-3%20IG.pdf
- NIST CMVP certificate #5175, DataKrypto Module for FHEnom. csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/5175
- Brandão, Peralta. NIST IR 8214C, NIST First Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes. January 2026. nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8214C.pdf
- NIST Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography project, FHE page. csrc.nist.gov/projects/pec/fhe
- NSA. CNSA 2.0 FAQ, version 2.2, October 2026. media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/1/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF
- UK NCSC. Advanced Cryptography white paper, version 1.0, 28 April 2025. www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/advanced-cryptography
- EDPB. Guidelines 02/2026 on anonymisation, version 1.0 for public consultation, adopted 7 July 2026 (paragraph 91). www.edpb.europa.eu/public-consultations/guidelines-022026-on-anonymisation_en
Operations, encoding and compilers
- Microsoft SEAL native examples: 1_bfv_basics, 2_encoders, 5_ckks_basics, 6_rotation (relinearization, batching, CKKS scale and slots, Galois keys). github.com/microsoft/SEAL/tree/main/native/examples
- Lattigo v6, package schemes/ckks (evaluator operations). pkg.go.dev/github.com/tuneinsight/lattigo/v6/schemes/ckks
- OpenFHE examples: CKKS_BOOTSTRAPPING.md, FUNCTION_EVALUATION.md, SCHEME_SWITCHING_CAPABILITY.md. github.com/openfheorg/openfhe-development/tree/main/src/pke/examples
- Cheon, Kim, Kim. Efficient Homomorphic Comparison Methods with Optimal Complexity. ASIACRYPT 2020, IACR ePrint 2019/1234. eprint.iacr.org/2019/1234
- Chillotti, Joye, Paillier. Programmable Bootstrapping Enables Efficient Homomorphic Inference of Deep Neural Networks. CSCML 2021, IACR ePrint 2021/091. eprint.iacr.org/2021/091
- Zama, TFHE-rs documentation: operations, ternary conditional, overflow detection, integer types and radix blocks. docs.zama.org/tfhe-rs/fhe-computation/operations
- Zama, TFHE-rs CPU integer benchmarks (vendor benchmark, AWS hpc8a.96xlarge). docs.zama.org/tfhe-rs/get-started/benchmarks/cpu/cpu-integer-operations
- Zama, Concrete documentation, quick overview (integers only, quantization, no branches or non-constant loops). docs.zama.org/concrete/get-started/quick_overview
- Zama, Concrete ML documentation, quantization. docs.zama.org/concrete-ml/explanations/quantization
- Viand, Jattke, Hithnawi. SoK: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Compilers. IEEE S&P 2021, arXiv 2101.07078. arxiv.org/abs/2101.07078
- HEIR documentation (data-oblivious transformation, ciphertext management, layout optimization). heir.dev/
- HEIR: A Universal Compiler for Homomorphic Encryption. arXiv 2508.11095 (preprint). arxiv.org/abs/2508.11095
- Gorantala et al. A General Purpose Transpiler for Fully Homomorphic Encryption. White paper, arXiv 2106.07893; repository archived. github.com/google/fully-homomorphic-encryption
- Dathathri et al. EVA: An Encrypted Vector Arithmetic Language and Compiler for Efficient Homomorphic Computation. PLDI 2020, arXiv 1912.11951. arxiv.org/abs/1912.11951
- Dathathri, Saarikivi, Chen et al. CHET: An Optimizing Compiler for Fully-Homomorphic Neural-Network Inferencing. PLDI 2019. www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/chet-an-optimizing-compiler-for-fully-homomorphic-neural-network-inferencing/
- Viand, Jattke, Haller, Hithnawi. HECO: Fully Homomorphic Encryption Compiler. USENIX Security 2023. www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/viand
- Cowan, Dangwal, Alaghi, Trippel, Lee, Reagen. Porcupine: A Synthesizing Compiler for Vectorized Homomorphic Encryption. PLDI 2021, arXiv 2101.07841. arxiv.org/abs/2101.07841
- Coyote: A Compiler for Vectorizing Encrypted Arithmetic Circuits. ASPLOS 2023. par.nsf.gov/servlets/purl/10467237
Market and adoption
- Fortune Business Insights. Homomorphic Encryption Market (analyst estimate; last updated 21 September 2026). www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/homomorphic-encryption-market-111218
- Precedence Research. Privacy Enhancing Computation Market (analyst estimate; updated 30 June 2025). www.precedenceresearch.com/privacy-enhancing-computation-market
- Grand View Research. Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Confidential Computing, Secure Multiparty Computation, Federated Learning and Synthetic Data Generation market reports (analyst estimates, 2024–2025). www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/privacy-enhancing-technologies-market-report
- MarketsandMarkets. Confidential Computing Market (press release, 31 May 2023; analyst estimate). www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/confidential-computing.asp
- MarketsandMarkets. Federated Learning Solutions Market (analyst estimate). www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/federated-learning-solutions-market-151896843.html
- Mordor Intelligence. Confidential Computing Market (analyst estimate). www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/confidential-computing-market
- Mordor Intelligence. Secure Multi-Party Computation Market (analyst estimate). www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/secure-multi-party-computation-market
- Confidential Computing Consortium. Confidential computing market could reach US$54 billion in 2026 (Everest Group study), 27 October 2021. confidentialcomputing.io/2021/10/27/confidential-computing-market-could-reach-us54-billion-in-2026/
- Confidential Computing Consortium. New study (IDC, commissioned by the consortium), 3 December 2025. confidentialcomputing.io/2025/12/03/new-study-finds-confidential-computing-emerging-as-a-strategic-imperative-for-secure-ai-and-data-collaboration/
- Gartner. Gartner Identifies Top Five Trends in Privacy Through 2024. Press release, 31 May 2022. www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2022-05-31-gartner-identifies-top-five-trends-in-privacy-through-2024
- Gartner. Press release on the 2021 Hype Cycle for Privacy, 30 September 2021.
- The Royal Society. From privacy to partnership: the role of privacy enhancing technologies in data governance and collaborative analysis. January 2023. royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/projects/privacy-enhancing-technologies/from-privacy-to-partnership.pdf
- ENISA. Cryptographic Products and Services Market Analysis. August 2024. doi.org/10.2824/249233
- US National Science and Technology Council. National Strategy to Advance Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing and Analytics. March 2023.
Ready to test the concepts?
Start with noise, encoding and circuit design. The advanced path then follows HSM custody, controlled decryption, rotation and shared decryption.
Related Resources
Check off all sections and mark this reading done.
Related modules
- PQC Hardware AccelerationSame track · Hardware Infrastructure · Same migration phase · Shares ML-DSA, ML-KEM, FIPS 203
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- KMS & PQC Key ManagementSame track · Hardware Infrastructure · Same migration phase · Shares ML-KEM, FIPS 203
- Aerospace PQCShares ML-DSA, ML-KEM, FIPS 203
Check your understanding
14 questions on Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), each with its answer and the reason.
Take the quizNext step
Produce the artifact: Infrastructure Modernization PlannerThis module belongs to phase 6 (Infrastructure & Performance); Infrastructure Modernization Planner produces a deliverable of that phase in the Command Center.
Production Tool Capabilities & Verification ChecklistPrivacy Engineers, Applied Cryptographers & Data Scientists
Capabilities to require in your production tools:
- Ring-LWE / RLWE parameter selection (BGV, BFV, CKKS, TFHE) compliant with the HomomorphicEncryption.org security standard parameter tables (ISO/IEC 28033 is still a Draft International Standard) and ≥128-bit security estimates.
- Strict noise-budget monitoring and circuit-depth bounds preventing decryption failures or key-recovery attacks from IND-CPA^D oracle leakage.
- Authenticated PQC transport (`ML-KEM` + `ML-DSA`) wrapping FHE evaluation keys and ciphertexts between client and compute nodes.
How to evaluate in your environment
Validate lattice dimension (N) and modulus (q) against the Lattice Estimator for at least 128-bit quantum security and test IND-CPA^D decryption error boundaries.
Production evidence to collect
FHE parameter security-level estimation report, noise-budget test log, and ciphertext serialization benchmark.
Completing this Hub module and its browser-based sample exercises teaches the technical and governance decision criteria for your role; it does not test, validate, or certify your deployed production systems.
Record evidence for your environment
Identify the tested build and configuration. Use reference IDs for observations. For a proposed exclusion, record the system boundary or rule and why it excludes this build.
Evidence missing. 0 of 3 requirements have a reference or scope rationale.
Learning module content can be inaccurate. Please double-check its information. Report inaccuracies in PQC Today GitHub Discussions.